Recent Issues in Property Coverage by O\u27Connor, Patrick J., Jr.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 3
2007
Recent Issues in Property Coverage
Patrick J. O'Connor Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
O'Connor, Patrick J. Jr. (2007) "Recent Issues in Property Coverage," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 34: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/3
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007 3:08:53 PM 
 
177 
 
RECENT ISSUES IN PROPERTY COVERAGE 
Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr.†
 I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................... 178 
 II. INTERPRETING POLICY LANGUAGE......................................... 178  
 III. PROPERTY INSURANCE............................................................ 186 
 A.  Builder’s Risk Insurance................................................... 187 
 B.  Insurable Interest ............................................................. 188 
 C.  Direct Physical Loss or Damage Requirement ..................... 190 
 D.  Business Interruption Coverage......................................... 191 
 E.  Valuing Property Losses .................................................... 193 
 F.  Collapse Coverage............................................................. 197 
 G.  “Like Kind and Quality” Provision................................... 197 
 H.  Inland Marine Coverage .................................................. 200 
 I.  Boiler and Machinery Insurance ....................................... 199 
 J.  Extra Expense Damages .................................................... 202 
 K.  Valuation Issues .............................................................. 204 
 L.  Mold-Related Losses ......................................................... 205 
 M.  E. coli Bacteria-Related Loss ............................................ 210 
 N.  Policy Exclusions.............................................................. 211 
 1.  Faulty Workmanship and Design Exclusion .................211 
 2.  Ensuing loss exception ................................................214 
 3.  Freeze/Thaw or Pressure/Weight of Water Exclusion .....216 
 4.  Latent Defect Exclusion...............................................216 
 5.  Surface Water Exclusion .............................................217 
 6.  Rust and Corrosion Exclusion .....................................218 
 7.  Earth Movement Exclusion .........................................219 
 8.  Vacancy Exclusion......................................................220 
 9.  Non-Permanent Property Exclusion..............................222 
 10. Vandalism Exclusion ...................................................222 
       † Partner at Faegre & Benson, LLP, practicing in the areas of construction, 
suretyship, insurance, dispute resolution, and risk management; Fellow of the 
American College of Construction Lawyer; Co-author of PHILLIP L. BRUNER & 
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW (2002); 
Adviser to the American Law Institute’s Restatement on Suretyship and Guaranty.  
Portions of this article are also published in PHILLIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. 
O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW (2002). 
1
O'Connor: Recent Issues in Property Coverage
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:08:53 PM 
178 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
 11.  Law and Ordinance Exclusion....................................222 
 12.  Water Without Roof Damage Exclusion .......................225 
 13.  Rotting Exclusion .......................................................225 
 O.  Mixed Causation: The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine . 223 
   IV. SUBROGATION REMEDIES....................................................... 228 
 A.  Contractual Waivers of Subrogation.................................. 234 
 B.  Equitable Subrogation vs. Equitable Contribution .............. 237 
 C.  Anti-subrogation Rule ...................................................... 238 
 D.  Assignment of Remedies .................................................... 242 
    V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 241 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hundreds of significant insurance cases are issued each year in 
the construction industry.  This paper focuses on cases issued 
within the last five years, with particular emphasis on property 
coverage.  Subrogation issues are also addressed because these 
often arise in property coverage settings.  While many insurance 
policies employ the same or similar language, when interpreting 
insurance policy language, the courts often employ too little 
uniform treatment.  This certainly is so with respect to liability 
coverage, but occurs in the property field as well. 
II. INTERPRETING POLICY LANGUAGE 
The principles employed to interpret insurance contracts are 
well established in most jurisdictions.  While the law differs a bit 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, broad agreement exists on the 
fundamental principles.  For example, most insurance contracts are 
interpreted such that unambiguous terms are accorded their plain 
and ordinary meaning.1  Moreover, a contract is not rendered 
ambiguous just because one of the parties attaches a different, 
subjective meaning to one of its terms.2  If, however, an ambiguity is 
present, any doubt as to the existence of coverage must be resolved 
in favor of the insured.3
 1. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 32  (4th ed. 1999). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See R & D Maidman Family L.P. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 783 N.Y.S.2d 205, 
211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/3
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:08:53 PM 
2007] RECENT ISSUES IN PROPERTY COVERAGE 179 
 
While uniformity on fundamental interpretation principles 
governing insurance contracts exists, the actual application of these 
principles to particular policy language is anything but uniform.  
The different approaches and conclusions reached by the Sixth 
Circuit and the Oregon Court of Appeals in interpreting the term 
“and/or” highlight the challenges in achieving consistent coverage 
interpretation.  In Detroit Water Team Joint Venture v. Agricultural 
Insurance Co.,4 a builder’s risk policy led to dispute because the 
existing property exclusion listed two conditions connected by 
“and/or.”  This clause raised the question of whether coverage was 
excluded when either condition existed or only if both conditions 
were satisfied.5  The Sixth Circuit found the term unambiguous and 
concluded that the exclusion applied “if either or both of the two 
specified conditions are met.”6
The Oregon Court of Appeals, however, found the phrase to 
be ambiguous. In Saif Corp. v. Donahue-Birran, the language at issue 
was contained in a state statute that affected the amount of 
coverage afforded under a workers’ compensation policy.7  Unlike 
the Sixth Circuit, the Oregon Court of Appeals found the term 
“and/or” very difficult to interpret: 
There is no easy answer to this conundrum because, in 
this context, the “and/or” either has to mean “and,” in 
which case SAIF is correct that claimant is not entitled to 
benefits under the rule, or it means “or,” in which case 
claimant is correct that he is entitled to benefits.  There 
simply is no way to give effect to both words, because 
“and” leads to one result, and “or” leads to the other, and 
there is no middle ground. 
 It is because of the inherent ambiguity of the phrase 
“and/or” that virtually all reputable sources advise that 
the phrase not be used.  In Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary 
of Modern Legal Usage 56-57 (2d ed. 1995), the use of the 
term “and/or” is discussed at length.  Garner notes that 
the term has been vilified in case law for the past century, 
       4.    371 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 5. Id. at 341–42. 
 6. Id. at 342.  See also Mich. Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Cheboygan, 37 N.W.2d 
116, 129 (Mich. 1949) (“There are occasions where intent may properly be 
expressed by ‘and/or,’ indicating ‘both, or either.’”); Local Div. 589, 
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 627 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(“[T]he words ‘and/or’ commonly mean ‘the one or the other or both.’”). 
 7. 96 P.3d 1282, 1283 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
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but that it is usually safe to assume that “x and/or y = x or 
y or both.”  He points out, however, that sometimes the 
term is “inappropriate substantively as well as stylistically,” 
because it is too indecisive, such as in a will that makes a 
bequest “to Ann and/or John.”  He observes that the 
problems of indecisiveness can be cured by using either 
“and” or “or,” depending on the meaning that is 
intended.  This case presents an excellent example of why 
the term should not be used: The drafters of the rule must 
have meant either “and” or “or” but could not have meant 
both, as different results flow from each reading, and 
there is no possible alternative reading that somehow 
could give effect to both.8
The Fourth Circuit engaged in an interesting analysis of policy 
language in the unpublished decision of Tankovits v. Del Suppo, Inc.9 
The insured, Del Suppo, designed and constructed swimming 
pools.10  It was sued by one of its customers, although the court 
provided few details as to the nature of the complaint.11  Del 
Suppo’s general liability insurance policy is, conversely, discussed at 
length.12  In addition to the standard ISO policy form, the 
declarations page made reference to a “Professional Liability 
Coverage Part.”13  The policy itself, however, contained only 
oblique references to professional liability coverage.14  The policy 
also contained an endorsement entitled “Errors and Omissions 
 8. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted).  See also Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 
S.W.2d 1082, 1084 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938) (“[T]he abominable invention, ‘and/or’, 
is as devoid of meaning as it is incapable of classification by the rules of grammar 
and syntax.”); Employers’ Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Tollefsen, 263 N.W. 376, 377 (Wis. 
1935) (“[T]hat befuddling, nameless thing, that Janus-faced verbal monstrosity, 
[used] as a cunning device to conceal rather than express meaning . . . .”); 
Stanton v. Richardson, (1875) 45 L.R.Q.B. 78 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.P.) 
([S]ix judges had six separate interpretations of “and/or.”); Cuthbert v. 
Cumming, (1855) 156 Eng. Rep. 668, (one of the first cases discussing the 
problems of interpreting “and/or.”).  See also DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF 
THE LAW 309 (1963) (“Ultimately the decision must be made, which is it — A or B 
or both?  And this decision is not helped by and/or.  That formula permits the one 
person who should know what he is talking about to dodge the decision, and fobs 
off the choice on a stranger — a lawyer, a judge — who may not have the slightest 
notion what the writer really meant.”). 
 9. 129 F. App’x 829 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 10. Id. at 830. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 830–32. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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Extension.”15  This endorsement provided additional coverage for 
“‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ due to any negligent act, 
error or omission committed during the policy period . . . .”16  By its 
express terms, the endorsement was subject to all policy 
exclusions.17  The endorsement made no mention of the 
Professional Liability Coverage Part.18
The insurer claimed that the extent of professional liability 
coverage was that set forth in the errors and omissions 
endorsement and, because policy exclusions applied to the claim, 
no coverage existed.19  In response to the charge that this position 
renders any professional liability coverage illusory, the insurer 
posited that coverage would apply if bodily injury arose from the 
insured’s negligent design of the swimming pool.20  The court was 
skeptical, concluding that subjecting the endorsement to all policy 
exclusions “appears to eliminate the potential for any coverage 
under the E&OE endorsement, thus making coverage under such 
endorsement illusory.”21 Notwithstanding the fact that the policy 
contained no express language describing the extent of 
professional liability coverage, the court found such coverage 
existed and that the allegations asserted against the insured fell 
within its scope: 
 Because professional liability coverage is generally 
understood to provide coverage for special risks inherent 
in the specific profession of the insured, one may 
reasonably interpret the Policy’s separate listing of the 
Professional Liability Coverage Part as providing coverage 
for risks not covered by the Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Part and its endorsements.  Thus, at least one 
reasonable interpretation of the Policy is that Del Suppo is 
covered for all bodily injury and property damage claims 
arising from its negligence, errors, and/or omissions in 
the execution of its professional work, i.e., in the 
construction of swimming pools and the walkways that 
surround swimming pools.22
Insurance policies contain provisions excluding certain losses 
 15. Id. at 831. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 832. 
 19. Id. at 834. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 836 n.2. 
 22. Id. at 836 (citations omitted). 
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from the scope of coverage.  Policy exclusions are quite varied and 
numerous.  Whereas the insured has the burden of establishing 
that a claim falls within the insuring clause, the insurer has the 
burden of proving the facts necessary for the operation of a policy 
exclusion.23  Policy exclusions are strictly construed, and any 
ambiguities are interpreted in the insured’s favor.24  Nevertheless, 
where policy exclusions unambiguously preclude coverage, courts 
will not re-write policy language to afford protection.25  Moreover, 
undefined terms will be given their plain and ordinary meaning.26
Because insurance policies are contracts, courts routinely 
apply one or more contract interpretation rules when making 
coverage determinations.27  The policies are also standard form 
agreements drafted by insurance companies; so, many courts 
employ a variety of adhesion contract principles. This is particularly 
the case with respect to interpreting policy exclusions.  A federal 
court, faced with having to interpret several insurance policies in 
connection with a claim of property damage to a television 
transmission tower, had occasion to use a variety of interpretation 
principles under Nebraska law.28  The court’s description of the 
interpretation rules governing policy language hits upon many 
common themes: 
 Under Nebraska law, courts must construe insurance 
policies to give effect to the parties’ intentions at the time 
the contract was made . . . .  A contract must be construed 
as a whole, and if possible, effect must be given to every 
part thereof.  In discerning the parties’ intentions, courts 
should first determine as a matter of law whether a policy 
is ambiguous.  An insurance policy is ambiguous when a 
word, phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is 
susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting 
interpretations or meanings.  Where a clause in an 
insurance contract can be fairly interpreted in more than 
 23. See Luikart v. Valley Brook Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 613 S.E.2d 896, 
901 (W. Va. 2005). 
 24. 17 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 1, § 49.111. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See PHILLIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR 
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:17 (2002). 
 28. Fireman’s Fund v. Structural Sys. Tech., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. 
Neb. 2006) (finding an ambiguity in a property policy with respect to property and 
interests covered). 
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one way, there is ambiguity to be resolved by the court as 
a matter of law. 
 Courts should determine whether a contract is 
ambiguous on an objective basis, not by the subjective 
contentions of the parties and are therefore not 
compelled to find ambiguity simply because the parties 
suggest opposing interpretations.  The resolution of an 
ambiguity in a policy of insurance turns not on what the 
insurer intended the language to mean, but what a 
reasonable person in the position of the insured would have 
understood it to mean at the time the contract was made.  
If a court concludes that a policy is ambiguous it may 
employ rules of construction and look beyond the 
language of the policy to ascertain the intention of the 
parties.  Rules of construction require that in the case of 
such ambiguities, the construction favorable to the 
insured prevails so as to afford coverage.  When an insurer 
wishes to limit its coverage, it is the duty of the insurer to 
draft the terms precisely. 
 However, if a court determines that a policy is not 
ambiguous then it may not resort to rules of construction, 
and the terms are to be accorded their plain and ordinary 
meaning as the ordinary or reasonable person would 
understand them.  In such a case, a court shall seek to 
ascertain the intention of the parties from the plain 
language of the policy . . . .  [A] court prefers the natural 
and obvious meaning of the provisions in a policy . . . . 
 Where coverage is denied, the burden of proving 
coverage under a policy is upon the insured.  However, 
the burden to prove that an exclusionary clause applies 
rests upon the insurer.  Exclusionary clauses will be 
liberally construed in favor of the insured.29
A New York decision employed the contract interpretation 
principle of ejusdem generis to conclude that exclusions in a property 
 29. Id. at 1023–24 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See 
also Nova Cas. Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2006) 
(holding that where policy language is plain and unambiguous, no special 
construction or interpretation is required, and the plain language of the policy 
will be given the meaning it clearly expresses); Tritschler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 
P.3d 519, 529 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (determining that where an insurance 
provision is susceptible to different interpretations, the court will attempt to 
discern its meaning by examining the language of the provision, the purpose of 
the transaction, and public policy considerations). 
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policy do not apply to damages caused by demolition work on 
adjoining property.30  In 242–44 East 77th Street, LLC v. Greater New 
York Mutual Insurance Co., an owner sought coverage for settling 
and cracking damage caused by demolition work.31  The insurer 
contended that the policy provided no coverage as an exclusion, 
entitled “Other Types of Loss,” set forth a list of excluded items 
including settling, cracking, shrinking or expansion, wear and tear, 
rust, corrosion, fungus, decay, deterioration or any quality in 
property that causes it to damage or destroy itself, smog, nesting or 
infestation, loss caused by dampness or dryness of atmosphere or 
changes in or extremes of temperature.32  While the owner’s 
damages took the form of settling and cracking injuries, the court 
concluded that the exclusion did not apply.33  Under the ejusdem 
generis rule of contract interpretation, the company the word keeps 
determines its meaning in a series of words.34  In this case, the long 
list of excluded items had one characteristic in common: they were 
limited to damages caused by natural phenomena.35  The owner’s 
property, however, was damaged by the human activity of 
construction operations on the adjoining property. 
Courts seldom resort to analyzing extrinsic evidence when 
interpreting policy language. Nothing, however, forbids a court 
from delving into extrinsic matters, particularly when it concludes 
that policy language is ambiguous.  Because insurance policies are 
standard contracts that are procured with limited negotiation, the 
amount of material extrinsic evidence can be quite limited.  What 
little negotiation occurs often takes place between the insurer and 
a broker or agent.  The legal consequence of extrinsic evidence can 
be influenced depending upon the status of the broker or agent.  
Knowledge about the extent of coverage afforded known to the 
insured’s agent may be imputed to the insured.36  On the other 
 30. 242–44 East 77th Street, LLC v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 815 
N.Y.S.2d 507, 510–12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 508–09. 
 33. Id. at 510. 
 34. Id.  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004) (defining ejusdem 
generis as “[a] canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a 
list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only 
items of the same type as those listed.”). 
 35. 242–44 East 77th Street, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 510. 
 36. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hebert Const., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 
1214, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (determining that factual issues remained as to 
whether agent/broker was acting as insured’s agent, thus imputing agent’s 
8
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hand, representations with respect to coverage by an agent of the 
insurer can bind the carrier to provide such coverage.37  Common 
types of extrinsic evidence encountered in policy interpretation 
include direct communications (often e-mail exchanges), premium 
information, and the insured’s application and disclosure 
statements.  All three types of extrinsic evidence were evaluated in 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Hebert Construction, Inc., and 
were found inadequate.38  Because insureds often do not know why 
or how insurers price insurance, premium information is often of 
little value unless a clear history of transparent premium 
information exists.39
Some insurance policies can become quite lengthy and 
complex, given the number of coverage parts, endorsements, 
exclusions, and riders.  On occasion, an insurer will suffer the 
consequences of this complexity if the exclusionary language it 
relies upon is buried within the fine text of a complex document.  
In USF Insurance Co. v. Clarendon America Insurance Co., a 
commercial general liability carrier sued a number of other 
insurers, claiming that they wrongfully refused to participate in the 
defense and indemnity of a contractor being sued by a homeowner 
for alleged construction defects.40  In concluding that an absolute 
earth movement exclusion was unenforceable, the court focused 
on its lack of conspicuousness and the insured’s reasonable 
expectations with respect to coverage: 
The exclusions to coverage set forth in the Clarendon 
National and Clarendon America policies comprise 
slightly more than six pages of text.  The absolute earth 
movement exclusion appears on the third of these pages, 
four pages after the general insuring clauses.  It is the only 
exclusion in the Policies that contains any language 
altering the defense obligation set forth in the insuring 
clauses, and there is no heading or language in the 
knowledge of coverage to insured). 
 37. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340  (S.D. Fla. 
2006) (acknowledging principle of promissory estoppel could well apply to deny 
insurer the right to rely upon policy exclusion where its agent represented to 
insured that coverage would be provided). 
 38. 450 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (W.D. Wash. 2006). 
 39. See Aetna Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kent, 540 P.2d 1383, 1387  (Wash. 1975) 
(suggesting that gross disparity of approximately thirty-to-one premium ratio 
between types of policies made it reasonable to believe that both parties intended 
the policies to provide mutually exclusive coverage). 
 40. 452 F. Supp. 2d 972 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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Policies that puts the insured on notice of this fact.  The 
relationship between the statement of the duty to defend 
found in the insuring clauses, and the limitation on that 
duty inserted in the absolute earth movement exclusion, 
therefore, is not plain and conspicuous.  Additionally, the 
scope of the exclusion’s limitation on the duty to defend 
is ambiguous.  The exclusion states that “where any claim 
or suit is based in whole or in part on earth movement,” 
the insurers will have the right, but not the obligation, to 
defend the “lawsuit.” . . .  Clarendon National and 
Clarendon America contend that under the absolute 
earth movement exclusion, they have no duty to defend if 
the underlying complaint contains an allegation of earth 
movement, whether or not that allegation concerns the 
insured or some other defendant.  The reference to 
“claim or suit” can be read more restrictively, however, to 
mean that the insurers have no duty to defend a lawsuit if 
it includes an allegation that property damage caused by the 
insured resulted, in whole or in part, from earth 
movement.41
 . . . . 
Such an interpretation [that the exclusion is limited to 
cases where the insured caused the harm] is consistent 
with the objectively reasonable expectations of the 
insured.  An insured might reasonably anticipate, based 
on the absolute earth movement exclusion, that if it is 
sued for property damage caused in part by soil 
movement, the insurer will have no duty to defend that 
suit.  An insured would not reasonably expect that its 
entitlement to a defense would disappear any time it is 
joined in a multi-defendant suit where a third-party 
claimant asserts a claim involving earth movement against 
some defendants, but not specifically against it.42
III. PROPERTY INSURANCE 
Property coverage protects an insured from loss in which it is 
an insurable interest when the loss is caused by certain covered 
“causes of loss,” or perils.  Common covered causes of loss include 
fire and wind.  The form of property coverage often involved in 
construction activities is a builder’s risk policy. Builder’s risk 
 41. Id. at 996–97. 
 42. Id. at 998. 
10
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insurance protects those who have an insurable interest in a 
building that is under repair, renovation, or construction. Unlike 
commercial general liability (CGL) coverage, which protects the 
insured against claims of third parties arising out of its acts or 
omissions that result in bodily injury or property damage, property 
insurance is first-party coverage.43
A. Builder’s Risk Insurance 
In the construction industry, the type of property policy most 
often encountered is the builder’s risk policy.  This variant of 
property coverage applies to structures that are undergoing 
construction or renovation.44  The types and sources of risks to real 
property while a structure is under construction are materially 
different than the risks encountered once the building is occupied.  
Nevertheless, in terms of its general structure, the builder’s risk 
policy is similar to property policies for completed and occupied 
structures.  One court discussed builder’s risk coverage thusly: 
“Builders risk” insurance is a unique form of property 
insurance that typically covers only projects under 
construction, renovation, or repair . . . .  The purpose of 
builder’s risk insurance is to compensate for loss due to 
physical damage or destruction caused to the construction 
project itself.  A policy of insurance containing a 
“‘builder’s risk’ clause or clauses should be construed 
reasonably and if uncertain in meaning, in favor of the 
contention of the insured so as to cover if possible a risk 
obviously sought to be insured.”45
 43. See Gap, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 782 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (App. Div. 
2004). 
A CGL policy pays a third-party claimant according to a judgment or 
settlement against the insured. 
  In contrast, insurance coverage for damage to property owned by the 
insured or “first-party coverage,” pays the insured the proceeds when the 
damage occurs, it protects an interest “wholly different” from that 
protected by third-party coverage.  “The principal distinction between 
liability and property insurance is that liability insurance covers one’s 
liability to others for bodily injury or property damage, while property 
insurance covers damage to one’s own property.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 44. See Royal Ins. Co. v. Duhamel Broad. Enters., 170 F. App’x 438 (8th Cir. 
2006) (noting that the property policy did not respond to collapse of television 
tower undergoing alteration by way of replacement of eighteen of more than one 
thousand diagonal braces). 
 45. Fireman’s Fund v. Structural Sys. Tech., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025 
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B. Insurable Interest 
For a party to qualify for coverage under a property policy, that 
party must have an insurable interest in the property insured.46  As 
a general rule, the threshold for establishing an insurable interest 
is not high.  Occasionally, however, it becomes a matter of dispute.  
For example, in Belton v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., an insured sought 
recovery under its property policy for a loss to a building destroyed 
by fire on which it had an option to purchase.47  The court held 
that the insured could not recover under the policy because he did 
not have any equity in the land and therefore, did not have an 
insurable interest.48
Two property coverage cases arising out of the World Trade 
Center (WTC) disaster explore the concept of “insurable interest” 
as it relates to property coverage.  In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. 
ABM Industries, Inc., a property insurer sought declaration as to the 
extent of coverage for losses suffered by a contractor that provided 
janitorial and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) 
services in common and tenanted areas of the WTC buildings.49  
ABM did extensive maintenance and infrastructure work at the 
WTC, employing more than 800 people in connection with its 
operations at the complex.50  Zurich insured all of the properties 
that ABM serviced throughout North America.51  The policy 
(D. Neb. 2006) (quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. Am. Ins. Co., 142 N.E. 340, 341–
42 (N.Y. 1923)) (citations omitted).  See also Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial 
New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So. 2d 651, 659 n. 8 (La. 2004). 
 46. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 277, § 11:107. 
 47. 602  S.E.2d 389 (S.C. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 391.  But see, e.g., JAM, Inc. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d 879 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
  An insurable interest may be a special interest entirely disconnected 
from any title, lien, or possession.  Thus, an insurable interest is not 
dependent upon the insured having title to the property, but instead may 
be derived from possession, enjoyment, or profits of the property, 
security or lien resting upon it, or it may be other certain benefits 
growing out of or dependent upon it.  Moreover, to be an insurable 
interest, the interest need not be such that the event insured against 
would necessarily subject the insured to loss; it is sufficient that it might 
do so, and that pecuniary injury would be the natural consequence.  
Courts make every effort to find insurable interest, and to sustain 
coverage, when there is any substantial possibility that the insured will 
suffer loss from the destruction of the property. 
Id. at 887 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. 397 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 50. Id. at 161-62. 
 51. Id. 
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contained an insurable interest provision, which covered loss or 
damage to “real and personal property, including but not limited 
to property owned, controlled, used, leased or intended for use by 
the insured.”52  In addition, extra expenses “incurred resulting 
from loss, damage, or destruction covered herein . . . to real or 
personal property as described in [the Insurable Interest 
provision]” were also covered.53  Another provision in the policy 
provided business interruption coverage for losses resulting from a 
lack of business due to “physical loss or damage, not otherwise 
excluded, to insured property at an insured location.’”54
The dispute between Zurich and ABM focused on the extent 
of business interruption coverage, which, in turn, was governed by 
the scope of the insurable interest provision.55  Zurich argued that 
ABM had to have a property interest such as ownership or tenancy 
in order to have the requisite level of “use” or “control” of insured 
property.56  The court disagreed, finding that “[t]he existence and 
configuration of the common areas and tenants’ premises were 
vital to the execution of ABM’s business purpose.”57  “These areas 
and premises were the means by which ABM derived its income 
and were as essential to that function as ABM’s cleaning tools.”58  
ABM, therefore, “used” or “controlled” this property, so the court 
found that ABM had an insurable interest in the covered 
property.59
In light of ABM’s substantial influence over, and 
availment of, the WTC infrastructure to develop its 
business, it is difficult to imagine what would constitute a 
“legally cognizable ‘interest’ in the property,” apart from 
ownership or tenancy.  The terms of the insurance policy, 
however, do not limit coverage to property owned or 
leased by the insured.  To the contrary, the policy’s scope 
expressly includes real or personal property that the 
insured “used,” “controlled,” or “intended for use.”60
The Second Circuit revisited an insurable interest question in 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 161. 
 56. Id. at 165. 
 57. Id. at 165–66. 
 58. Id. at 166. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 167  (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the context of the WTC disaster in Citigroup, Inc. v. Industrial Risk 
Insurers.61  Citigroup leased twenty-four floors at Seven WTC.62 The 
lease “obligated Citigroup to carry insurance on ‘Tenant’s 
Property,’ defined as property ‘which can be removed without 
jeopardizing the structural integrity of the Building’ or causing 
‘irreparable damage . . . to the Building systems.’”63  Citigroup 
sought recovery under the landlord’s property policy for the loss of 
its permanent but removable property.  The landlord’s property 
policy, however, did not cover “Tenant’s Property,” as defined in 
the lease, and, therefore, the landlord’s insurer did not have an 
insurable interest in Citigroup’s property.64
C. Direct Physical Loss or Damage Requirement 
In John S. Clark Co. v. United National Insurance Co., the court 
considered whether a general contractor could recover under an 
all-risk property policy for the costs incurred to repair defectively 
built portions of a Parish Life Center for the Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Charlotte, North Carolina.65  Interestingly, the 
design/build construction agreement required the owner to secure 
“all risk” insurance for physical loss or damage, including damage 
resulting from defective design, workmanship, or materials.66  The 
owner purchased a property policy that agreed to indemnify the 
owner and design/builder for all risks of physical loss or damage to 
real and personal property occurring during the period of 
insurance.67  During the course of construction, high winds and 
inadequately reinforced masonry walls resulted in a partial collapse 
of the building.68  The design/builder repaired not only the 
collapsed portion, but also the defectively built portions of the 
construction that suffered no wind damage.69  The court concluded 
that the policy did not respond to the costs incurred to repair the 
“undamaged” property as the repair of one’s own faulty 
workmanship or negligent construction does not constitute 
 61. 421 F.3d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 304 F. Supp. 2d 758 (M.D.N.C. 2004). 
 66. Id. at 761–62. 
 67. Id. at 762. 
 68. Id. at 762–63. 
 69. Id. at 763. 
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“physical loss or damage” as required by the insuring clause of the 
property policy.70
D. Business Interruption Coverage 
Standard property coverage responds to the “brick and 
mortar” costs of replacing destroyed property.  If the insured, 
however, uses the property in a commercial activity, it is quite likely 
that property loss will also cause business interruption damages.  
Valuing business interruption loss can be tricky.  Claims of lost 
future profit may be attacked as speculative.  Damages for lost 
profits cannot be based upon hypothetical or speculative forecasts 
of losses.71  Disputes over business interruption loss have a tendency 
to devolve into duels between financial experts making forecasts 
based upon past performance and industry indices.72
 70. Id. at 764-69.  See also City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 
F.3d 38, 41–45 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding coverage under a policy insuring 
“against risks of direct physical loss or damage to the property insured” did not 
extend to cover costs of repairing defective welds that had not yet failed); Trinity 
Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 916 F.2d 267, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The 
language ‘physical loss or damage’ strongly implies that there was an initial 
satisfactory state that was changed by some external event into an unsatisfactory 
state—for example, the car was undamaged before the collision dented the 
bumper.  It would not ordinarily be thought to encompass faulty initial 
construction.”); Whitaker v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d 612, 
615-17 (E.D. Va. 1999) (determining that an “all risks” policy’s coverage of 
fortuitous losses does not mandate coverage for the repair of construction defects 
as part of a “direct physical loss”); N. Am. Shipbuilding, Inc. v. S. Marine & 
Aviation Underwriting, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that 
“all risks” insurance policies need no express exclusion for damages due to faulty 
workmanship or faulty initial construction because “Trinity makes clear that these 
types of damage . . . are not covered to begin with.”); Wolstein v. Yorkshire Ins. 
Co., 985 P.2d 400, 407-08 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that coverage under 
a policy insuring against “all risks of physical loss of or damage” did not extend to 
cover costs to repair faulty workmanship or faulty initial construction). 
 71. Iron Steamer, Ltd. v. Trinity Rest., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 767, 770 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
 72. See Blis Day Spa, LLC v. Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F. Supp. 2d 621 
(W.D.N.C. 2006). The court concluded that plaintiff’s estimates were not unduly 
speculative so as to remove the issue from the jury: 
Hartford contends that Blis’s estimates of lost profits as a matter of law 
are unduly speculative and therefore it is entitled to summary judgment 
because there is no competent evidence of additional business 
interruption losses.  Specifically, Hartford points to the fact that:  1) 
Heil’s calculations assume that Blis would have increased its number of 
revenue producing hairdressers to sixty-six during the period of 
interruption when in fact there were only fifty-six hairdressers; and 2) 
Heil’s assumed revenue generated by each hairdresser, $6134, derived 
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Another WTC case, Lava Trading, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance 
Co., discussed the length of time an insurer must pay for business 
interruption losses.73  The insured maintained offices, including a 
functioning data center, on the eighty-third floor of One WTC.74  
The insured sold computer programs to assist in the electronic 
trading of equities in various equity markets.75  In addition to its 
office in the WTC complex, the insured maintained a small, nearly- 
complete backup location at 75 Broad Street that was not destroyed 
in the terrorist attacks.76  Following the September 11, 2001, attack, 
the insured converted its Broad Street location into a functioning 
data center, and eventually to a more permanent location.77
The insured asserted a claim under its business interruption 
policy.78  A dispute arose over the amount of the claim and the 
period of disruption.79  The business interruption policy provided 
reimbursement for actual loss of business income sustained during 
the period of restoration.80  The policy defined “period of 
restoration” as that period of time that begins with the date of 
direct physical loss and “ends on the date when the property at the 
described premises should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with 
from the industry average, grossly overstates the actual revenue 
generated before, during, and after the period of interruption.  In 
response, plaintiffs argue Heil has provided ample support and 
explanation for his methodology, figures, and assumptions employed in 
reaching his estimates.  Heil first examined Blis’s financial 
documentation and its business plan, and interviewed Blis’s management 
and its supplier, Jim Barr.  He then utilized the following factors to 
calculate anticipated monthly business income: maximum available hours 
of service operation, the most used hourly service rate, available service 
providers, operational realization percentage, and Blis’s historical trends, 
including what he considered its upward trend towards profitability.  Heil 
determined the maximum available hours of operation, and multiplied 
that by the “most used hourly service rate” of $71.  Heil then multiplied 
this number by the anticipated number of service providers, based on the 
space available, for the six-month period of interruption.  He then 
applied to that number a “realization number” of 40-55%, a number 
derived by starting from the “industry” figure of 70%, the assumed 
maximum efficiency rate for hairdressers, and then adjusting downward. 
Id. at 630. 
 73. 365 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 74. Id. at 437. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 438–39. 
 79. Id. at 436. 
 80. Id. at 439. 
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reasonable speed and similar quality.”81  The insured took the 
position that the period of restoration would not end until its new 
facility was completed.82  The court disagreed, finding that coverage 
terminated once the insured secured reasonable replacement 
space to conduct its operations.83
E. Valuing Property Losses 
Property policies may be written on a number of different 
reimbursement bases.  For example, some policies pay the insured 
the actual cash value of the insured property.  Other policies are 
written on a replacement basis.  The Nebraska Supreme Court, in 
Olson v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa,84 wrestled with 
determining the actual cash value of a loss to a grain storage 
building, where the policy did not define the term.  The court 
explained: 
 As used in a property insurance policy, the phrase 
“actual cash value” is a limitation on the amount of 
recovery for the protection of the insurer.  It is not a 
substantive measure of damages.  Where, as here, the 
policy does not contain a specific definition, it has been 
noted that [“]there is a priority of rules to determine 
actual cash value as follows. (1) where market value is 
easily determined, actual cash value is market value, (2) if 
there is no market value, replacement or reproduction 
costs may be used, (3) failing the other two tests, any 
evidence tending to formulate a correct estimate of value 
may be used.[”]85
The insurer calculated the actual cash value of the loss based 
on the cost of repairing the partially damaged building and making 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 438. 
 83. Id.  See also Streamline Capital, L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 02 Civ. 
8123(NRB), 2003 WL 22004888, at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (reasoning that 
the “period of restoration” ends by the time the insured, a former WTC tenant, 
should have been able to reestablish its business operations elsewhere—in the 
time its personal property in its WTC offices should have been repaired, rebuilt, or 
replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality—not  when the entire WTC is 
rebuilt).  But see Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 
2d 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the term “property” in the applicable 
period of restoration provision unambiguously referred to the “specific premises 
at which Duane Reade operated its WTC store.”). 
 84. 696 N.W.2d 453 (Neb. 2005). 
 85. Id. at 458 (quoting 12 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 175:26 (3d ed. 1998)) (citations omitted). 
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a deduction for depreciation from the cost of repair.86  While the 
court acknowledged that this approach might work for completely 
destroyed structures, it was inappropriate for partially damaged 
structures: 
 We agree with the district court that on the record 
presented, the policy did not permit the depreciation 
deduction claimed by Le Mars. As we have previously 
determined, the insured building had an actual cash value 
of $200,000 at the time of the loss.  In its damaged 
condition, its value was reduced to $100,000, the price for 
which Olson sold it to Land.  Le Mars elected to calculate 
its payment under the policy based upon the cost of 
repairing the partial damage, which was $95,040.  There is 
no evidence that the repairs would cause the actual cash 
value of the building to exceed $200,000.  Recovery of the 
full repair costs without a depreciation deduction will 
therefore restore the value of the insured property that 
existed immediately prior to the loss, but will not enhance 
that value.  Accordingly, we conclude that under an actual 
cash value policy which does not expressly provide 
otherwise, an insurer may not deduct depreciation from 
the cost of repairing partial damage to insured property 
where the actual cash value of the property, as repaired, 
does not exceed its actual cash value at the time of the 
loss.87
The Sixth Circuit, in Parkway Associates, LLC v. Harleysville 
Mutual Insurance Co., addressed the issue of whether a repair 
contractor’s overhead and profit was a proper constituent in 
calculating actual cash value of a loss.88  Parkway owned a hotel that 
was damaged by a tornado.89  The parties could not agree on 
proper valuation of the loss, and the district court ordered the 
 86. Id. at 456–57. 
 87. Id. at 460–61.  See also Kane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 841 A.2d 1038, 
1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“[I]n the absence of clear language to the contrary, an 
insurer may not deduct depreciation from the replacement cost . . . and the 
phrase ‘actual cash value’ may not be interpreted as including a depreciation 
deduction, where such deduction would thwart the insured’s expectation to be 
made whole.”).  But see Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. City of Coffeyville, 630 F. Supp. 166 
(D. Kan. 1986) (ruling that insurer was entitled to deduct depreciation from the 
cost of repairing  a structure partially damaged by fire); Zochert v. Nat’l Farmers 
Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 576 N.W.2d 531 (S.D. 1998) (permitting deduction of 
depreciation from repair costs where policy differentiated between actual cash 
value and replacement cost coverage, and insured elected former). 
 88. 129 F. App’x 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 89. Id. 
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parties to submit to the appraisal process required by the policy.90  
The appraisers issued an award with two different valuations: 
$694,549, based on a replacement cost value, and $607,728, based 
on an actual cash value.91  Both values contained an amount for a 
general contractor’s overhead and profit.92  The district court 
determined that the policy permitted Parkway only to recover the 
actual cash value of its loss, and further concluded that the 
contractor’s overhead and profit should be deducted from the 
actual cash value.93  In disagreeing with the district court’s analysis, 
the Sixth Circuit stated: 
 Parkway’s policy provides that it is entitled to recover 
the actual cash value of its loss.  The actual cash value of a 
loss is equal to the repair or replacement costs less 
depreciation.  The Tennessee courts have not determined 
what repair or replacements costs include.  Other courts, 
however, have held that repair or replacement costs 
logically and necessarily include any costs that an insured 
reasonably would be expected to incur in repairing or 
replacing the covered loss.  Although there are some types 
of losses where the services of a contractor would normally 
not be utilized, there are many instances where the 
insured reasonably would be expected to call a contractor, 
especially where there is extensive damage. If a contractor 
would reasonably not be required to repair an insured’s 
loss, then contractor’s overhead and profit would not be 
included in replacement costs.  In the instant case, 
however, Parkway would reasonably be expected to hire a 
contractor to repair its property.  Since the actual cash 
value of a loss is the repair or replacement costs less 
depreciation, and since the cost of a contractor would 
reasonably be incurred in repairing Parkway’s damaged 
property, then the costs of contractor’s overhead and 
profit would be included in the actual cash value of 
Parkway’s loss.94
In Assurance Co. of America v. Adbar, L.C., Missouri’s “value 
policy” statute, which prohibits property insurers from denying that 
“the property insured thereby was worth at the time of the issuing 
 90. Id. at 958. 
 91. Id. at 958–59. 
 92. Id. at 959. 
 93. Id. at 961. 
 94. Id. at 962  (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19
O'Connor: Recent Issues in Property Coverage
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:08:53 PM 
196 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
of the policy the full amount insured” did not apply to a builder’s 
risk policy.95  As the Eighth Circuit noted: 
A “builders risk” policy is a common form of fire 
insurance for buildings under construction in which the 
policy declares the completed value of the building but 
the insured pays a reduced premium in exchange for 
lesser amounts of coverage prior to completion.  It is 
settled that the Missouri courts do not construe [Missouri 
Revised Statutes] section 379.140 as requiring a builders 
risk insurer to pay the declared completed value if the 
policy obligates the insurer to pay only a lesser amount for 
a fire loss that occurs prior to completion.96
The boundaries of the valuation appraisal process called for 
under most property policies were examined in Kendall Lakes 
Townhomes Developers, Inc. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Lines 
Insurance Co.97  An insured suffered loss to its townhouse complex 
due to a windstorm.98  The insured’s appraiser estimated the 
covered loss at approximately $716,000, but the insurance carrier 
said that the damage to all nine buildings was less than $1000.99  
Because of this, the deductibles did not cover the damage.100  Based 
upon the conflicts in the appraisals, the trial court appointed an 
umpire to determine the amount of loss.  The court’s order 
expressly reserved for the court the determination whether the loss, 
in whole or in part, was caused by a covered cause of loss.101  The 
umpire, after reviewing the two appraisal reports and conducting a 
hearing, entered an award that the insured “did not carry the 
burden of proof to establish insurance coverage.”102
The trial court confirmed the umpire’s award and the insured 
moved to vacate.103  The insured first argued—or at least the court 
of appeal so characterized the argument—that, under Florida law, 
the umpire had no authority to rule on the causation of the 
damage.104  The Florida Court of Appeal disagreed, as causation is a 
 95. 129 F. App’x 334, 334–35 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 96. Id. at 334 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Doug Rose, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 
698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).  See also MO. REV. STAT. § 379.140 (2002). 
 97. 916 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 98. Id. at 13. 
 99. Id. at 14. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 15. 
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coverage question for the court when an insurer wholly denies that 
a covered loss exists.105  Where the insurer acknowledges that a 
covered loss exists, causation is an “amount-of-loss question” for the 
appraisal panel to determine.106  Nevertheless, the court vacated the 
award on the grounds that the umpire exceeded the authority 
granted by the trial court: 
Contrary to the trial court’s order, the umpire did not do 
as directed as the umpire’s report did not state the total 
loss or “breakdown the amount of the loss by virtue of 
excluded causes.” While an umpire has the authority to 
resolve causation issues, since the trial court specifically 
reserved this issue for the court’s determination, the 
umpire in this case exceeded the authority granted to it by 
the trial court. The trial court’s order additionally and 
clearly states that “[t]he Court shall be the ultimate finder 
of fact on the issue of whether the loss, in whole or part, 
was caused by a covered cause.” In contravention of the 
trial court’s order, the umpire did not fulfill the tasks 
assigned to it and instead made factual findings as to 
coverage, an issue not in dispute and an issue it lacked 
authority to resolve; and causation, an issue which 
pursuant to the trial court’s order, the trial court had 
reserved for itself.107
F.  Collapse Coverage 
The cases discussing collapse coverage under a property policy 
generally fall into one of three camps.  The narrow view is that 
collapse coverage is limited to the actual falling down of a covered 
structure.  The broad view is that any substantial structural 
impairment that threatens collapse falls within coverage.  A third 
view is somewhere between these narrow and broad views and 
includes the threat of imminent collapse.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, in 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Insurance 
Group,108 adopted the third view—sometimes referred to as the 
“broad” view, depending upon the court’s perspective—and found 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 16 (citing Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 828 So. 2d 1021, 
1022 (Fla. 2002)). 
 107. Id. (quoting Kendall Lakes Townhomes Developers, Inc. v. Agric. Excess 
& Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2447887, at *3 (Fla. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2005) 
(alteration in original). 
 108. 879 A.2d 166 (Pa. 2005). 
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that policy language insuring against “risks of physical loss involving 
collapse” provides coverage for the imminent collapse of a building 
or part thereof.109  The Indiana Supreme Court, in Monroe Guaranty 
Insurance Co. v. Magwerks Corp.,110 determined that “collapse” for 
property insurance purposes means substantial impairment of the 
structural integrity of a building or any part thereof, and no 
requirement exists of a sudden and complete disintegration of the 
structure.111  In Hilton Head Resort Four Seasons Centre Horizontal 
Property Regime Council of Co-Owners, Inc. v. General Star Indemnity Co., 
damaged and deteriorating roofs, which included missing shingles 
and rotten wood without any sagging or drooping, were insufficient 
to trigger collapse coverage.112
The competing theories over the scope of collapse coverage 
reflect competing policy concerns.  Narrow coverage is justified on 
the grounds that to extend coverage for structural impairment 
short of collapse turns the insurance policy into a sort of 
maintenance agreement.113  Broader coverage is sometimes justified 
on the grounds that to restrict policy benefits to instances where 
the building actually falls down creates an incentive to forego 
repairs to avert imminent collapse.114
Property coverage for losses incurred as a result of the collapse 
or partial-collapse of the insured structure can be a contentious 
matter due to a number of factors, including policy language.  For 
example, in Assurance Co. of America v. Wall & Associates LLC of 
Olympia, the policy excluded loss or damage caused directly or 
indirectly by “collapse.”115  Nevertheless, the policy also stated that if 
the collapse results from a “Covered Cause of Loss,” the insurer 
 109. Id. at 174. 
 110. 829 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 2005). 
 111. Id. at 972. 
 112. 357 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886–87 (D.S.C. 2005). 
 113. See Doheny W. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997) (expressing concern over turning insurance policies 
into maintenance agreements, but nonetheless finding that “collapse” extended to 
“imminent” falling down of the structure). 
 114. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Grunberg, 553 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (App. Div. 1990) 
(agreeing with the “numerical majority of American jurisdictions [that] a 
substantial impairment of the structural integrity of a building is said to be a 
collapse” because to require the building to fall down would be “unreasonable” in 
light of an insured’s duty to protect property from further damage).  See also 
Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assoc., LLC of Olympia, 379 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that policy covered not only actual collapse, but also imminent 
collapse). 
 115. 379 F.3d 557, 560–63 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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would pay for the loss.116  Moreover, the policy responded to 
damages due to collapse caused by “hidden decay.”117  In this case, 
water infiltration caused deterioration of bricks and wallboard, 
which created a high risk of failure of structural support for the 
brick facing.118  The insured undertook repairs to the façade before 
it had a chance to collapse.119  The insured claimed that the policy 
responded to the loss because the building was in imminent danger 
of collapse due to “hidden decay.”120  The district court ruled 
against the insured, holding that “collapse,” under the policy, 
meant “a sudden falling down.”121  The Ninth Circuit disagreed: 
 The policy language at issue here comprehends a 
broader meaning than what the district court assigned. . . . 
The policy here states, “We will pay for loss or damage 
caused by or resulting from risks of direct physical loss 
involving collapse of a building or any part of a building 
caused . . . by . . . hidden decay.”  The term “collapse” 
does not appear in the policy in isolation; instead, it is 
qualified by the terms “risks of direct physical loss” and 
“involving.”  Certainly, as in Rosen, if the policy specified, 
“We insure only for direct physical loss to covered 
property involving the sudden, entire collapse of a 
building or any part of a building,” and, in turn, defined 
“collapse” as “actually fallen down or fallen into pieces,” 
the district court would have properly attributed to the 
word “collapse” the definition of “a sudden falling down.”  
However, . . . the clause here contains much more.  To 
interpret the clause as a whole to mean that coverage 
extends only upon “a sudden falling down” impermissibly 
disregards the other aspects of the clause and renders 
them ineffective. . . .  We therefore conclude that this 
policy language not only covers actual collapse but also 
imminent collapse.122
 116. Id. at 559. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 558–59. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 559. 
 122. Id. at 563.  See also Sandalwood Condo. Ass’n at Wildwood, Inc. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that to recover for direct 
loss involving “collapse” caused by hidden decay or insect damage, the structure 
did not need to be in imminent danger of collapse, but damage to it had to 
substantially impair structural integrity of the building). 
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G. “Like Kind and Quality” Provision 
Property policies may be drafted in such a way as to require the 
insurer to replace damaged property with one of “like kind and 
quality.” In Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., the 
insured’s roof was damaged by a hail storm.123  While the property 
insurer was undertaking its investigation, the insured retained a 
contractor to replace the roof for $179,000.124  The replacement 
roof was of the same kind as the prior roof, but was affixed to the 
building mechanically, rather than by ballast, as was the original 
roof.125  The property carrier issued a check for $145,460, 
representing the cost of an identical roof attached by ballast.126  
The insured objected, arguing that the roof it paid for was 
“comparable” to its prior roof, and therefore the insurer should 
have paid $179,000.127  The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the 
insured, finding that the “like-kind and quality” provision in “the 
policy neither restricted nor required [the insured] to pay for the 
cost to replace the roof with an identical one.”128  The policy 
allowed more leeway, and because the only evidence as to 
comparability was the insured’s expert, the insurer was responsible 
for reimbursing the full cost of the roof.129
H. Inland Marine Coverage 
Another form of property coverage sometimes encountered in 
the construction industry is “inland marine” coverage. 
 The term “inland marine” technically applies to 
transportation on the nation’s inland waterways . . . but by 
the turn of the 20th century, “inland marine” had come to 
signify insurance for property transported by land. 
 Today, most waterborne cargo is insured as “ocean” or 
“wet” marine, which has its own standards of liability, 
policy forms, and underwriting criteria.130
 
 123. 150 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. 2004). 
 124. Id. at 424. 
 125. Id. at 424–25. 
 126. Id. at 425. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Joseph S. Harrington, Inland Marine Insurance, ROUGH NOTES MAG., May 1, 
2004, at 30. 
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Contractors transporting expensive pieces of equipment often 
insure against the risks of damage during the course of transit.131  
Inland marine insurance “function[s] basically as a form of 
property insurance, even though the policy may explicitly 
contemplate that the value of the property will be payable to the 
owner rather than the insured.”132  The federal district court in 
Nebraska had occasion to discuss coverage under a “commercial 
inland marine coverage form” in connection with the collapse of a 
television tower.133  The opinion is somewhat frustrating because 
the facts are set forth in a separate memorandum and, therefore, 
difficultly arises in determining the factual background that the 
court actually applied to its coverage determinations.  The 
commercial inland marine policy is described as covering a variety 
of property (i.e., materials, machinery, and equipment for which 
the insured has assumed liability and for which the insured has 
contracted to install or erect), and the duration of coverage is 
described as follows: 
 This policy attaches from the time the property is at risk 
of the Insured and, except as excluded elsewhere in the 
policy, covers continuously thereafter during transit, while 
awaiting and during installation, and terminates when: 
 a. the interest of the Insured in the property ceases, or 
 b. the installation or erection of the property is 
completed and accepted as satisfactory, or 
 c. this policy expires or is cancelled: 
 whichever of the foregoing conditions first occurs.134
The court concluded that Fireman’s inland marine policy 
responded to the damages due to the tower collapse, although it is 
difficult to tell from the opinion what specific facts led to the 
conclusion.135 The court’s analysis treats the inland marine policy 
like a form of builder’s risk coverage. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carman Cartage Co., 636 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Neb. 
2001) (quoting 11 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 
154:3 (rev. ed. 1998)). 
 133. Fireman’s Fund v. Structural Sys. Tech., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1016 
(D. Neb. 2006). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1027. 
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I.  Boiler and Machinery Insurance 
Boiler and machinery insurance coverage is another special 
type of property insurance designed to cover losses associated with 
equipment malfunction of pressurized, electrical, and electronic 
machinery.  Typical equipment covered by this insurance includes 
boilers, generators, engines, pumps, compressors, and turbines.  
Refrigeration and air conditioning equipment is also the subject of 
this coverage.  Common electrical objects such as transformers, 
reactors, circuit breakers and other items that might be critical for 
plant operation may be covered.  This coverage is sometimes 
encountered in instances where the contractor is responsible for 
start-up and commissioning activities. 
These policies usually require the equipment malfunction to 
result from an accident, which is defined as a “sudden” and 
“accidental” breakdown of the object or part of the object.  Chronic 
failures of equipment attributable to age are typically not 
covered.136
J.  Extra Expense Damages 
After property loss, extra expense damages associated with 
maintaining the business enterprise and costs associated with repair 
and replacement that are not “brick and mortar” are another 
common “soft cost” property loss.137  The cost of renting other 
space to maintain the business is an “extra expense” item.  
Architectural fees and interest expense to rebuild are extra 
expenses. 
It is not uncommon for property policies to contain a variety of 
sub-limits for soft cost items.  The Georgia Court of Appeals, in RLI 
Insurance Co. v. Highlands on Ponce, LLC, found an ambiguity in the 
manner in which the property policy addressed soft and hard 
costs.138  A fire seriously damaged an apartment complex.139  The 
complex was insured through RLI in excess of $29 million for any 
one occurrence.140  In addition to this blanket limit of liability 
 136. See 515 Assoc. LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 160 F. App’x 147, 151 
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding that boiler and machinery policy did not respond to 
elevator breakdown that was neither sudden nor accidental). 
 137. See Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Handling Construction Risks 2007: Allocate Now 
or Litigate Later, REAL EST. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (2007). 
 138. 635 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 139. Id. at 169. 
 140. Id. 
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provision, the policy also contained “additional limits of insurance” 
for soft costs and lost business income, each to $100,000 per 
occurrence.141  RLI took the position that the amount of coverage 
available for soft costs was $100,000 and a similar amount for 
business income loss.142  The insured took the position that these 
were “additional” limits and applied “in addition to” the blanket 
limit of $29 million.143  The court found an ambiguity, which 
precluded granting summary judgment in favor of RLI: 
 On the one hand, the contract could be interpreted to 
mean that soft costs and business costs are limited to 
$100,000 per occurrence, irrespective of the blanket limit 
of $29,507,000.  On the other hand, however, given the 
clause that “additional limits” apply in addition to the 
blanket limit of liability, and soft costs and business costs 
were identified as having additional limits of $100,000, the 
contract could also be interpreted to mean that once the 
blanket limit has been exhausted, there remained 
$100,000 for use to pay for liabilities in soft cost and 
business income over and above the blanket limit. 
 Moreover, the policy stipulates that “[t]he insurer shall 
not be liable for more than $29,507,000.00 for any one 
occurrence, except as hereinafter provided.”. . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he agreement between the parties remains 
ambiguous as to whether the coverage for soft costs and 
business income exceeded $100,000.  Thus, it is for a jury 
to consider the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction to determine the scope and effect of the 
policy between RLI and Highlands . . . .144
The court determined that after applying standard rules of 
construction—e.g., interpreting the contract as a whole and 
construing ambiguities against the drafter—the agreement 
remained ambiguous and a jury should resolve the issue.145  As is 
sometimes the case with these disputes, conflicting extrinsic 
evidence was placed before the court with respect to what the 
insured’s insurance agent knew about policy coverage.146
 141. Id. at 170. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 171–72 (alteration in original). 
 145. Id. at 172. 
 146. Id. See also Blis Day Spa, LLC v. Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F. Supp. 2d 621, 
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K. Valuation Issues 
Since 2001, a year has not gone by without at least one 
published insurance decision issued in connection with the WTC 
disaster.  SR International Business Insurance Co. v. World Trade Center 
Properties, LLC involved a dispute over the amount of property 
insurance recoverable for tenant improvements affixed to the WTC 
complex.147  The parties’ disagreement focused on how to value 
tenant improvements.148  The developer argued “the improvements 
should be treated the same way as the buildings to which they were 
attached—that is, like the WTC’s ‘core and shell,’ they should be 
included in the replacement cost at their full appraised value.”149  
The insurers, noting that many of the tenants that occupied space 
on September 11, 2001, terminated or abandoned their leases, 
argued that the improvements cannot be valued at full replacement 
cost because they will never be “replaced.”150  Instead, the 
improvements should be valued based upon “‘the unamortized 
portion of the Port Authority’s original contribution to these 
improvements,’ [which] they claim[ed] constitute[d] the limit of 
the Insureds’ actual interest in the improvements.”151
This valuation disagreement is the basic difference between 
recovery under a “replacement cost” policy and recovery available 
under an “actual cash value” policy.  As the court explained: 
 Replacement cost policies provide greater coverage than 
traditional “actual cash value” policies by permitting the 
insured to replace damaged or destroyed property with 
new property without any deduction.  By paying an extra 
premium for replacement cost coverage, the insured can 
recover on a “new-forold” [sic] basis instead of the “old-
for-old” recovery provided by ACV [actual cash value] 
coverage.  However, in order to collect this larger amount, 
the insured must actually replace the damaged property 
630-31 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (finding the property policy ambiguous with respect to 
whether it responds to advertising costs as language stated that insurer would 
provide “necessary” extra expenses incurred during the period of restoration and 
both parties disputed what were “necessary” expenses and the policy did not 
define the term “necessary”). 
 147. 445 F. Supp. 2d 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 148. Id. at 326. 
 149. Id. at 331. 
 150. Id. at 331–32. 
 151. Id. 
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consistent with the RCE [replacement cost 
endorsement].152
The court did not accept the insurer’s argument that 
replacement cost coverage was not available.153  Part of the court’s 
reasoning had to do with the jurisdiction and authority of the 
appraisal panel responsible for valuing the losses.154  As is common 
in property coverage disputes, the appraisal panel had limited 
jurisdiction, namely, to determine the extent of the insured’s 
loss.155  These panels do not typically get involved in coverage 
issues.  Coverage determinations are for the court.  In this case, the 
court held that, although actual replacement is a condition 
precedent to collecting replacement proceeds, it was not a 
condition precedent to valuing hypothetical replacement costs, 
which is all the appraisal panel was authorized to do.156  Moreover, 
the court was not convinced that, under the facts presented, the 
improvements would never be replaced.157  While it is true that the 
WTC was not going to be rebuilt, replacement is determined on a 
“functional similarity” basis and against this backdrop it is possible 
that the improvements will be replaced as the insureds have said 
that they intend to construct a new office and retail complex that 
will presumably include tenant improvements.158
L. Mold-Related Losses 
Coverage disputes over mold-related losses continued 
unabated in 2005.  In 40 Gardenville, L.L.C. v. Travelers Property 
Casualty of America, the insured purchased a vacant building located 
in West Seneca, New York.159  Gardenville purchased an all-risk 
policy from Travelers for the property.160  Travelers’s underwriter 
did not inspect the building before issuing the policy, which 
contained a standard exclusion for “corrosion, rust or dampness.”161  
Representatives of the insured, however, did inspect the building 
 152. Id. at 326 n.6 (alteration in original). 
 153. Id. at 332. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 333. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 334–35. 
 159. 387 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 160. Id. at 208. 
 161. Id. 
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before purchasing the policy.162  One testified that he “observed 
leaks in the roof and large holes on the exterior walls, water 
draining into buckets and leaking from the open valve of the 
sprinkler system, puddles of standing water, and wet carpeting 
throughout the building.”163  He also “observed a substance 
resembling dirt on the vinyl baseboards along the second floor that 
he later learned was mold.”164  Notwithstanding these observations, 
the court ruled that neither the “fortuitous loss” doctrine nor its 
counterpart, the “known loss” defense, operated to bar coverage at 
the summary judgment stage.165  While an insurer is not obligated 
to pay out policy benefits to an insured who is aware of a loss before 
it purchases the policy, in this case, while the insured certainly 
knew the building was in rough shape, it could not be held, as a 
matter of law, that the insured knew the property was contaminated 
with mold.166  Nevertheless, coverage did not exist because the 
policy’s “dampness” exclusion applied: 
[T]his Court finds the water or dampness present in the 
building was the proximate cause of the mold 
contamination.  As such, the unambiguous language of 
the policy excluding coverage for losses caused or 
resulting from dampness applies to Plaintiff’s claim for 
mold loss, and operates as a bar to Plaintiff’s recovery in 
this matter.167
Property policies usually include a mold exclusion.  Water 
damage, however, is a common cause of loss.168  Mold growth and 
water infiltration have a close causal tie, so a raging dispute exists in 
the industry over whether property policies respond to mold losses 
where water infiltration, a covered cause of loss, caused or 
contributed to the mold.169  The debate is complicated by fairly 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 209. 
 165. Id. at 212. 
 166. See id. (reasoning that “[w]hile this admission certainly supports 
Defendant’s position that mold existed in the building prior to the inception of 
the policy, it does not compel the conclusion that Mr. Hickson was aware of the 
mold contamination at that time.”). 
 167. Id. at 214. 
 168. See id. at 213 (citing expert testimony on water damage to buildings). 
 169. See, e.g., Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Lotz, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1304 (E.D. Wis. 
2005) (holding contamination and deterioration exclusions contained in a 
homeowner’s policy excluded coverage for mold and rot); Polk v. Landings of 
Walden Condo. Ass’n, No. 2004-P-0075, 2005 WL 1862126, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 5, 2005) (holding the mold exclusion in both policies eliminated coverage 
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common exclusionary language that incorporates an “ensuing loss” 
exception.  The relevant language is as follows: 
 We do not cover loss caused by: 
 . . . . 
 (2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi. 
 . . . . 
 We do cover ensuing loss caused by collapse of the 
building or any part of the building, water damage, or 
breakage of glass which is part of the building if the loss 
would otherwise be covered under this policy.170
Courts go back and forth on whether this “ensuing loss” 
language restores coverage for mold.  Courts that found coverage 
usually concluded that mold was an ensuing loss of water 
damage.171  Courts that found no coverage often did so on the 
grounds that “ensuing loss” was loss that followed from some other 
cause.172  In other words, coverage applied only where the water 
damage ensued from some other non-covered loss, such as mold.  
The Texas Supreme Court resolved a long-running dispute within 
the state over this issue by concluding that the ensuing loss 
language did not restore coverage for mold loss: 
 To “ensue” means “to follow as a consequence or in 
chronological succession; to result, as an ensuing 
conclusion or effect.”  An “ensuing loss,” then, is a loss 
which follows as a consequence of some preceding event 
for mold damage in a condominium).  See also Bureau v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 129 F. App’x 927 (6th Cir. 2005)  (permitting expert testimony that mold was 
caused by improper maintenance of roof rather than by a particular storm event); 
Qualls v. State Farm Lloyds, 226 F.R.D. 551, 558 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (requiring 
expert testimony, under a Texas homeowner’s policy, to establish causation for a 
mold claim allegedly stemming from a plumbing leak); Kemmerer v. State Farm 
Ins. Cos., No. Civ.A. 01-5445, 2004 WL 87017 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2004) (requiring 
expert testimony to establish that a specified peril, under homeowner’s policy, 
caused the mold infestation).  But see Garza v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, No. Civ.A.M-
04–270, 2005 WL 2388254, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding mold damage 
resulting from water leaks due to gradual roof deterioration was not a loss ensuing 
from a covered event). 
 170. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. 2006). 
 171. See Garza, 2005 WL 2388254 at *2.  “This Court has specifically held that 
despite language in the Policy purportedly excluding coverage for mold damage, 
the Policy covers mold damage to a dwelling or personal property that ensues from 
an otherwise covered water damage event under the policy.”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 172. Id. (stating the “general mold exclusion in the Policy precludes coverage 
for mold occurring naturally or resulting from a non-covered event.”). 
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or circumstance. . . . If we give to the language of the 
exception its ordinary meaning, we must conclude that an 
ensuing loss caused by water damage is a loss caused by 
water damage where the water damage itself is the result 
of a preceding cause.173
Of course, when a description of the “ordinary meaning” of 
insurance language is as complex as the above quote, the courts, 
not surprisingly scatter on this point.  Moreover, the Texas 
Supreme Court was split with Justices Medina and O’Neill 
dissenting.174  Others believe that neither party in Fiess had the 
correct interpretation: 
 William J. Chriss, as amicus curiae, argues that neither 
party has it right.  Amicus submits that the Feisses [sic] 
interpret water damage from the ensuing-loss provision 
too broadly, essentially ignoring Lambros and reading 
“ensuing” out of the provision.  The amicus further argues 
that State Farm’s circular interpretation of the provision 
ignores the meaning of the word “otherwise,” thus 
depriving the provision of virtually any meaning.  Amicus 
submits that the correct and more reasonable 
construction of “otherwise be covered” is that it refers to 
the remainder of the policy other than the paragraph 
under consideration.  Thus, according to the amicus, 
water damage including mold, which results from an 
excluded peril as Lambros requires, would be covered 
because such loss is not excluded anywhere else in the 
policy other than in paragraph f.175
Thus, while the Texas Supreme Court apparently resolved the 
issue in the Lone Star state, the debate will likely continue 
elsewhere.176
 173. Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 749 (quoting Lambros v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 530 
S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)). 
 174. Id. at 753 (Medina, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 756.  The dissent also pointed out that the Texas Department of 
Insurance read the “ensuing loss” language differently than the majority.  Id.  The 
Texas Department of Insurance concluded that the “‘provision can only be read to 
mean that despite any exclusion language, it includes coverage for certain 
previously excluded damage which is caused by a covered water loss.’”  Id. 
 176. See Souza v. Corvick, 441 F.2d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that 
“earth sinking” exclusion did not exclude coverage for damage resulting from 
subsidence caused by something other than natural soil conditions); New Zealand 
Ins. v. Lenoff, 315 F.2d 95, 95–96 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that “settling” exclusion 
barred recovery for damage caused by house settling into soil unless immediate 
cause of settling was an unanticipated event rather than an inevitable occurrence); 
Church of the Palms-Presbyterian (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 
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2d 1339, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that “fungus” exclusion excluded 
coverage for mold damage where both parties agreed that mold was a fungus); 
Cooper v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (D. Ariz. 2002) 
(holding that ensuing loss provision does not reinsert coverage for excluded mold 
damage even if proximately caused by covered water event, but reaffirms coverage 
for secondary losses ultimately caused by excluded perils); Schloss v. Cincinnati 
Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094–95 (M.D. Ala. 1999), aff’d 211 F.3d 131 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that ensuing loss exception to “loss caused by rot” exclusion 
did not restore coverage for cost of repairing insured’s rotted wood studs); 
Vermont Elec. Power Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 441, 445 (D. Vt. 1999) (holding that damage caused by design defect was 
the “loss,” not an “ensuing loss,” and, thus, exclusion for “loss caused by faulty or 
defective design” barred coverage); Banks v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 91–6982, 1993 
WL 40113, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1993) (barring recovery for ensuing loss 
under a policy provision that expressly excluded original cause of the damage); 
Ames Privilege Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 742 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. 
Mass. 1990) (holding that ensuing loss clause, which provided coverage for losses 
caused by included perils, did not nullify the exclusion for wood rot); Murray v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
damages sustained as a result of a copper pipe leak were within deterioration 
exclusion and ensuing loss provision did not obligate insurer to pay costs 
associated with repairing the faulty pipe); Beach v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 
532 A.2d 1297, 1298 n. 1 (Conn. 1987) (holding that ensuing loss clause could be 
understood to have contemplated coverage for a “collapse” that “ensues” from 
excluded activity such as earth settling); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Branch, 234 So. 2d 
396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that ensuing loss clause restored 
coverage for cracks and fractures in house caused by blasting activities even 
though policy excluded coverage for damage caused by “cracking” of foundations 
and walls); Bd. of Educ. Of Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 684 
N.E.2d 978, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that presence of asbestos in building 
was a “latent defect” within meaning of latent defect exclusion and ensuing loss 
clause did not operate to restore coverage for loss or damage caused by asbestos); 
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Warren, 675 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
that exclusion for “water below the surface of the ground” did not refer to water 
from melted ice which ran down side of insured’s house into ground next to 
foundation); Shields v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (La. Ct. App. 
1986) (permitting recovery for structural damage ensuing from an instantaneous 
rather than gradual collapse); Myers v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. C8–02–62, 
2002 WL 1547673, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (holding that ensuing loss 
clause did not restore coverage for damage caused by expressly excluded mold); 
Cantrell v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 876 S.W.2d 660, 662–
663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “contamination” exclusion did not exclude 
coverage for damage caused by toxic smoke directly and necessarily resulting from 
the covered fire); Weeks v. Co-Operative Ins. Cos., 817 A.2d 292, 296 (N.H. 2003) 
(holding that negligent work exclusion barred coverage, even though the 
exclusion contained an exception providing coverage if an excluded cause of loss 
resulted in a covered cause of loss); Narob Dev. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 631 
N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that ensuing loss exception did 
not apply to loss directly related to excluded risk); Umanoff v. Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins., 442 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (permitting recovery for 
damage to real property because insurer failed to establish that it would have been 
unreasonable for the average person to conclude that raccoons were excluded 
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M. E. coli Bacteria-Related Loss 
In Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hardinger, homeowners fell 
ill with respiratory infections and skin problems shortly after 
moving into their new home.177  Their property insurer arranged 
for testing of the home and discovered that it was contaminated 
with e. coli.178  After a number of unsuccessful attempts to clean the 
property, the homeowners simply gave the property back to their 
bank.179  Their insurer notified them that it was denying coverage 
on the theory that the loss predated the policy and was excluded by 
the pollution exclusion.180  The trial court agreed with the insurer 
that, although the insureds gave up their home, they did not 
establish a “physical loss to property.”181  The Third Circuit vacated 
the district court’s ruling, analogizing the situation to cases where 
an insured is denied the use of property because of asbestos 
contamination.182  In Port Authority of New York & New Jersey v. 
“vermin”); Alwart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 508 S.E.2d 531, 533–34 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1998) (holding that faulty workmanship exclusion applied to the cost of 
repairing the ensuing loss, whether direct or indirect); Boughan v. Nationwide 
Prop. & Cas. Co., No. 1–04–57, at *3 2005 WL 126781 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 
2005) (holding that ensuing loss clause did not restore coverage for losses caused 
by a specifically excluded peril); Phillips v United Services Auto. Ass’n, 146 S.W.3d 
629, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that ensuing loss clause provided 
coverage for losses caused by faulty workmanship provided that those losses were 
not excluded from coverage); McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 
1000, 1003-04 (Wash. 1992) (holding that ensuing loss clause only applied to 
losses ensuing from an uncovered event if those losses are covered perils); 
Richland Valley Prod., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Co., 548 N.W.2d 127, 132-33 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that ensuing loss clause provided coverage for 
direct loss resulting from excluded cause only if that loss would otherwise be 
covered). Moreover, in jurisdictions which apply the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine, coverage may be afforded for mold if it is determined that the efficient 
proximate cause of the loss is a covered “cause of loss” such as water infiltration.  
See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maples, 309 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Arkansas law, mold exclusion may not apply where mold was caused by a burst 
frozen pipe, which is a covered peril, and policy language negating the efficient 
cause doctrine did not apply to mold exclusion); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 770 P.2d 704, 707–08 (Cal. 1989) (holding that coverage should be denied 
where the efficient proximate cause of loss is an excluded peril); Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. 1999) (holding that if the efficient 
proximate cause of loss is a covered peril, then there would be coverage regardless 
of whether subsequent events within the chain of causation are excluded). 
 177. 131 F. App’x 823 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 178. Id. at 824. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 825. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 826. 
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Affiliated FM Insurance Co., the Third Circuit remanded to the trial 
court for determination of whether the pollution exclusion 
applied.183  In a concurring opinion to Motorists Mutual Insurance, 
however, Justice Thomas L. Ambro opined that the exclusion was 
likely ambiguous under the facts of this case, and predicted that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would likely follow the Arizona 
precedent of Keggi v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 
which found that a pollution exclusion did not apply to bacteria-
related injury.184
N. Policy Exclusions 
1. Faulty Workmanship and Design Exclusion 
Most property policies contain workmanship exclusions.  One 
such exclusion was found to be ambiguous in Otis Elevator Co. v. 
Factory Mutual Insurance Co.185  The insured entered into a contract 
with the Metropolitan Airport Commission (MAC) to build an 
Automated People-Mover (APM) along the length of the new “C” 
Concourse at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport.186  During the 
testing of the APM, the tram crashed at the end of the tracks.187  
The resulting damage to the tram, the buffer, and the terminal wall 
created repair costs of $2 million.188  In addition to these costs, Otis 
also paid $1.5 million worth of liquidated damages to MAC because 
of the delay in completing the project.189  Otis sought to recover its 
losses from the builder’s risk policy purchased by the MAC.190  The 
insurer denied coverage based on a policy exclusion that read: 
This Policy excludes the following, but if physical damage 
not excluded by this Policy results, then only that resulting 
damage is insured: 
 1) faulty workmanship, material, construction or design 
from any cause. 
 2) loss or damage to stock or material attributable to 
 183. 311 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying New York and New Jersey law). 
 184. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 131 F. App’x at 826 (Ambro, J., concurring); Keggi 
v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 13 P.3d 785, 791 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). 
 185. 353 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D. Conn. 2005). 
 186. Id. at 276. 
 187. Id. at 277. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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manufacturing or processing operations while such stock 
or material is being processed, manufactured, tested, or 
otherwise worked on.191
The accident occurred because one of the insured’s 
subcontractors deviated from test protocol by failing to engage the 
secondary brakes while operating the tram.192  The insurer claimed 
that this failure amounted to “faulty workmanship” excluded under 
the builder’s risk policy.193  The court disagreed, finding that the 
term “faulty workmanship” did not encompass a breach of the 
testing protocol: 
[T]he term “faulty workmanship” does not encompass the 
damage at issue.  The tram itself was not faulty 
workmanship in the sense of a “flawed product” because it 
already had been completed at the time of the accident.  
The tram was not a “flawed process” because the 
construction of the tram already was complete, even if it 
had not actually been accepted by MAC, at the time of the 
accident.  By either definition of “faulty workmanship,” 
defendant’s claim that the tram is faulty workmanship 
when sent at full speed, overloaded and without brakes, is 
forced.  The accidental property damage to the tram 
cannot be termed “faulty workmanship.” It is simply 
accidental damage resulting from subcontractor 
negligence unrelated to the quality of any product or 
process. 194
The court also determined that the testing exclusion did not 
apply because the tram cars could not be considered “stock,” as 
that term is used in the exclusion.195  Stock is kept as inventory for 
use or sale to customers; the trams were custom-manufactured and 
installed as part of the airport’s APM system.196  Moreover, the 
trams were not “material” as used in the exclusion, “A tram is the 
complete machine and cannot be considered a component of 
itself; thus, it cannot be ‘material.’”197
 191. Id. at 278. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 281. 
 195. Id. at 283. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 283.  See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 929 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(distinguishing between “flawed product” and “flawed process,” finding that faulty 
workmanship only applies to the former); City of Burlington v. Hartford Steam 
Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding that 
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The faulty workmanship exclusion was successful in 
eliminating coverage in Andray v. Elling.198  In Andray, an insured 
homeowner decided to make some electrical, plumbing, and 
structural changes to his new home.199  Unfortunately, he hired 
contractors who did not perform the work particularly well and the 
homeowner was required to hire other contractors to correct the 
resulting problems.200  When the homeowner turned the claim over 
to his homeowner’s insurance carrier, the claim was denied on the 
grounds that faulty workmanship was not covered under the 
policy.201  The insured sought to avoid this exclusion by claiming 
that a concurrent covered cause, namely the contractors’ acts of 
vandalism, contributed to the loss.202  The court rejected this theory 
on the ground that no evidence existed to prove the damages were 
anything more than the result of incompetence.203
Property policies often exclude poor workmanship or design 
from the group of otherwise covered “causes of loss.”  In E.L. 
Rincon Supportive Services Organization, Inc. v. First Nonprofit Mutual 
Insurance Co., the court considered whether “excavation” activities 
fell within an exclusion for faulty “construction.”204 The insured’s 
property was not under construction.205  Rather, excavation 
activities on the adjacent property caused damage to the insured’s 
property.206  After consulting a number of dictionaries, which did 
not on their face appear to settle the issue, the court invoked the 
“reasonable person” analysis: 
“faulty workmanship” cannot be read to encompass “accidental damage to the 
product caused by the builder’s negligence during construction”); M.A. 
Mortenson Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. Civ.98-2319/RHK/JMM, 1999 
WL 33911358 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 1999) (noting the difference between “flawed 
product” and “flawed process”); Kroll Constr. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 594 F. 
Supp. 304, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that deficiencies in subcontractor’s 
waterproofing materials and/or work requiring costly corrections by general 
contractor were captured by exclusion); Schultz v. Erie Ins. Group, 754 N.E.2d 
971, 976--77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding term “faulty workmanship” 
unambiguous and signifying “at the very least . . . a component of the building 
process leading up to the finished product”). 
 198. No. L-04-1150, 2005 WL 567035 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2005). 
 199. Id. at *1. 
 200. Id. at *1–2. 
 201. Id. at *3. 
 202. Id. at *4. 
 203. Id. at *5. 
 204. 803 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 205. Id. at 534. 
 206. Id. 
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Based on the plain, ordinary meaning of the term 
“construction,” we conclude that a reasonable person 
would consider the construction process to encompass 
excavation activities.  For instance, it is commonly 
understood that excavating activities are necessary to lay 
the foundation in the construction of a building.  Since 
we conclude that the term “construction” includes 
excavation activities, the property damage resulting from 
the construction excavation operations on the adjacent 
property is excluded under the policy.207
In another case, a builders’ risk policy did not respond to 
damage to wood siding as a result of this exclusion.208
2. Ensuing loss exception 
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Texpak 
Group, N.V., the faulty workmanship exclusion applied where 
insureds sought coverage for business interruption and extra 
expense losses due to a contractor’s defective design and 
installation of upgrades to a paper mill. 209  The insureds argued 
that their business interruption and extra expense costs fell within 
the “ensuing loss exception” to the faulty workmanship/design 
exclusion.210  Under this exception, the policy does not respond to 
costs of making good defective designer specifications, “this 
exclusion shall not apply to loss or damage resulting from such 
defective design or specifications . . . .”211  The policy, however, 
expressly dealt with business interruption and extra expense losses, 
stating that these damages were covered when “resulting from loss  
 207. Id. at 538.  See also Nat’l Hous. Bldg. Corp. v. Acordia of Va. Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 591 S.E.2d 88, 91 (Va. 2004) (holding that the design exclusion operated to 
bar coverage for defectively designed retaining wall that failed, and that the 
policy’s “Duties in the Event of Loss” provision requiring the insured to take steps 
to protect the covered property from further damage, i.e., fix the retaining wall, 
did not provide relief as such duties—and the insurer’s responsibility to reimburse 
the insured to fulfill these duties—is not triggered unless there is a covered loss). 
 208. Carney v. Assurance Co. of Am., 177 F. App’x 282, 283 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he policy unambiguously excludes coverage for the damage at issue because 
it was caused by or resulted from faulty workmanship in the failure to properly 
stain and protect the wood.”).  See also Elworthy v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 166 
F. App’x 353 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that damage to homeowner’s floors fell 
within policy exclusion for damage caused by faulty, inadequate, or defective 
materials used in repair, construction, renovation or remodeling). 
 209. 906 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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. . . covered herein . . . to real or personal property . . . .”212  As the 
court noted: 
 Under the clear and unambiguous terms of this policy, 
business interruption and extra expense losses are 
covered only if “resulting from” damage or destruction of 
real or personal property caused by a covered peril.  Since 
defective design or specifications are not perils covered by 
this policy, economic damage or loss resulting from these 
causes are excluded from coverage as well.213
A California federal decision discussed at some length the 
“ensuing loss” language found in many faulty workmanship 
exclusions.  In Sapiro v. Encompass Insurance, the exclusion in 
question excluded from “building losses incident to . . . inadequate 
or defective . . . workmanship.”214  However, the exclusion also 
stated “any ensuing loss not excluded or excepted . . . is covered.”215  
In this case, the insured’s home was damaged due to water 
infiltration and mold growth due to a defective exterior stucco 
job.216 The court found that the faulty workmanship exclusion 
unambiguously excluded the loss notwithstanding the “ensuing 
loss” provision: 
 California’s courts have long defined an “ensuing loss” 
as a loss “separate” and “independent” from [an] original 
peril.  Plaintiffs’ losses are neither; they are, rather, 
abstrusely phrased reformations of the same “gap”-related 
losses-losses plaintiffs concede are excluded by Safeco’s 
“faulty workmanship” clause.  In fact, none of the 
supposedly “ensuing losses” plaintiffs identify can be 
 212. Id. at 302. 
 213. Id.  See also GTE Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 598, 616 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (observing that insured could not “recover for just any ensuing or 
resulting business loss–the underlying peril resulting in business interruption must 
be covered.”); Caren Carney v. Assurance Co. of Am., No. Civ. JFM-04-3434, 2005 
WL 899843, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2005) (finding no coverage under builder’s risk 
policy for damages resulting from siding that was properly installed but damaged 
by use of improper preservative); Montefiore Med. Ctr v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 226 F. 
Supp. 2d 470, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“An ensuing loss provision does not cover loss 
caused by the excluded peril, but rather covers loss caused to other property 
wholly separate from the defective property itself.”); Laquila Const., Inc. v. 
Travelers Indemnity Co. of Ill., 66 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Swire Pac. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 167–68 (Fla. 2003) (ensuing-loss 
exception not applicable if the ensuing loss directly related to the original 
excluded risk). 
 214. 221 F.R.D. 513, 521 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 215. Id. at 522. 
 216. Id. 
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categorized as “ensuing losses,” if even losses at all.  
Plaintiffs’ alleged “moisture” and “fungal” losses are 
directly attributable to the initial negligent contracting.  
Plaintiffs’ “reconstruction” costs are neither separate nor 
“ensuing” by any legitimate measure; they are the price 
for repairing the predicate damage.217
3. Freeze/Thaw or Pressure/Weight of Water Exclusion 
Another exclusion typically found in property policies involves 
damage caused by “freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of water 
or ice . . . .”  This exclusion sometimes operates to bar coverage for 
a partial collapse due to snow load.218
4. Latent Defect Exclusion 
A common property insurance exclusion pertains to “latent 
defects.”  This exclusion applied in Walker v. McKinnis, where the 
insureds’ home was damaged when water intruded into the 
basement during heavy rains because of the geometry of the 
home’s roof and gutter system.219  In applying the latent defect 
exclusion, the court reasoned: 
The policy does not define “latent defect.” Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary defines the adjective, 
“latent” as follows: “existing in hidden, dormant, or 
repressed form, but usually capable of being evoked, 
expressed, or brought to light; existing in posse; not 
manifest; potential.” 
 The report of appellants’ expert, an architect, stated 
that the water intrusion was caused by “the geometry of 
the roof and gutter system.” According to the expert, 
“[t]he vector of the roof valleys directs roof run off along 
the main A-frame gutters where there is no down spout 
outlet.” The expert stated in his report that during “very 
heavy rain events,” water overflowed from the gutters onto 
the ground and eventually into the basement through a 
window well. Appellants did not hire anyone to 
independently inspect the house prior to taking 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Wurst v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 501, 505–06 
(D.N.J. 2006). 
 219. No. CA2004-10-082, 2005 WL 1864144, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2005). 
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occupancy. However, appellant, Christopher Walker, 
stated in an affidavit contained in the record that the 
house “did not have any visible defects” when he 
purchased it. 
 Based on the above facts and our review of the entire 
record, we find no error in the common pleas court’s 
determination that the defect in the “geometry of the roof 
and gutter system” was a “latent defect,” and that it caused 
the water intrusion and subsequent damage. Consistent 
with the ordinary meaning of “latent,” the defect in the 
roof and gutter system “existed in hidden form” and was 
“not manifest” at the time appellants purchased the 
property and entered into the contract with West 
American.220
5. Surface Water Exclusion 
Property policies often contain exclusions for loss caused by 
surface water runoff.  In State ex rel. State Fire & Tornado Fund of 
North Dakota Insurance Department v. North Dakota State University, the 
university’s heating plant suffered damage when large amounts of 
rain water, which had collected on an adjacent sports facility site, 
entered the plant through a steam tunnel.221  The university’s 
property insurance carriers denied coverage on grounds that the 
water damage was excluded by the flood and surface water 
exclusions.222  In agreeing with the insurers, the court 
acknowledged the difficulty of applying the “surface water” 
exclusion to a particular factual setting.223  The court determined 
that the exclusion applied even though the “surface water” was 
 220. Id. at *1–2. 
 221. 694 N.W.2d 225, 227–28 (N.D. 2005). 
 222. Id. at 228. 
 223. Id. at 230, 235.  See also Heller v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 800 P.2d 1006, 1009 
(Colo. 1990) (explaining that the exclusion did not preclude coverage where 
water originated from natural runoff of melted snow, but was diverted into man-
made trenches which were “defined channels” that prevented percolation, 
evaporation, or natural drainage); Smith v. Union Auto Indem. Co., 752 N.E.2d 
1261, 1266–67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (reasoning that the exclusion precluded 
coverage where rainwater filled homeowner’s basement, notwithstanding the fact 
that the flow was altered by such manmade objects as streets and other paved 
surfaces); State Farm Lloyds v. Marchetti, 962 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App. 1997) 
(noting that the exclusion did not preclude coverage for damage caused by 
sewerage backup after heavy rain, as the loss was proximately caused by sewage 
which was non-floodwater, even though the sewage invaded the home due to 
floodwater). 
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diverted underground through a steam tunnel.224  The water was 
merely following gravity and did not change its essential nature by 
flowing through an underground steam tunnel.225
6. Rust and Corrosion Exclusion 
Another common property policy exclusion pertains to 
damages caused by rust and corrosion.  The exclusion applied in 
Gilbane Building Co. v. Altman Co., where Gilbane was hired as the 
construction manager on a new manufacturing plant.226  Gilbane 
hired Altman to provide cast-in-place concrete for the building.227  
The contract called for Altman to “etch” the concrete floor, which 
essentially involved removing the concrete agents used to cure the 
concrete floor and to rough the surface of the floor so that it could 
receive the final sealant.228  The method selected to perform the 
etching process was to use a muriatic acid product called E-Z 
Muriatic Acid.229  Apparently, the process caused the stainless steel 
hardware, switch plates, and copper piping throughout the 
building to discolor.230  In contesting the application of the “rust 
and corrosion” exclusion, Altman claimed that, while the 
discoloration was due to rust and corrosion, the court should apply 
the common sense and ordinary understanding of the terms “rust” 
and “corrosion” and conclude that a fast-acting, acid-based 
chemical reaction, is not the type of rust and corrosion intended to 
be excluded under the policy.231  The court did not find Altman’s 
argument persuasive: 
 The ACE policy bars coverage for loss resulting from 
rust and corrosion. The policy does not qualify this 
exclusion to cover only gradual-forming rust and 
corrosion or fast-forming rust and corrosion. The parties 
have stipulated that the loss at issue here was due to 
corrosion and rust on the metal surfaces of the equipment 
 224. State ex rel. State Fire & Tornado Fund, 694 N.W.2d at 232. 
 225. Id. at 233.  See also Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hicks Thomas & Lilienstern, 
L.L.P., 174 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App. 2004) (concluding that the exclusion 
applied where heavy rains from a tropical storm caused a bayou to overflow its 
banks causing floodwater to flow into man-made underground structures causing 
damage to a law firm’s office). 
 226. No. 04AP–664, 2005 WL 534906, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at *3. 
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/3
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:08:53 PM 
2007] RECENT ISSUES IN PROPERTY COVERAGE 219 
 
and piping in the electrical/mechanical rooms and the 
UPS rooms in which the etching was performed. 
Therefore, this court finds that the “rust and corrosion” 
exclusion in the policy provided by ACE bars coverage.232
7. Earth Movement Exclusion 
Many property policies contain an earth movement exclusion.  
On occasion, the exclusion is also found in CGL policies.  In Hoang 
v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn) LLC, the CGL policy in question 
excluded coverage for property damage “arising out of, caused by, 
resulting from, contributed to, aggravated by, or related to 
earthquake, landslide, mud flow, subsidence, settling, slipping, 
falling away, shrinking, expansion, caving in, shifting, eroding, 
rising, tilting or any other movement of land, earth or mud.” 233  
The insured claimed that the exclusion did not apply to movement 
of “artificial fill.”234 In this case, a number of newly built residences 
were damaged because of soil problems and expansion of the 
artificial fill placed under the homes’ foundations.235 The Colorado 
Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of the exclusion 
because the policy language did not admit a distinction between 
natural and artificial causes, and to create one would rewrite policy 
language.236
As a general rule, this exclusion is intended to eliminate 
coverage for earthquake damage, sink holes, and other earth 
 232. Id. at *5.  See also Cent. Int’l Co. v. Kemper Nat’l Ins. Cos., 202 F.3d 372 
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the exclusion applied to coils that corroded during 
overseas shipping); Bettigole v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 1259 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the exclusion applied to damages caused by de-icing 
salts used on a parking deck); S.W. Energy Corp. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1999) (holding that the exclusion applied to damages caused by rust and 
corrosion in an oil tank). 
 233. 129 P.3d 1028, 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 149 P.3d 798 (Colo. 
2007).  The Colorado Supreme Court reversed on the issue of whether the 
insurance proceeds covering the builder’s liability are available to a subsequent 
purchaser, holding “the proceeds of the CGL insurance policy at issue in this case 
are available through garnishment to satisfy the judgment of a subsequent 
purchaser . . . . ”  Hoang, 149 P.3d at 801. 
 234. Hoang, 129 P.3d at 1035–36. 
 235. Id. at 1032, 1035–36.  The district court “found that the damage here was 
caused by water pressure associated with clay soils and the fill materials underlying 
the homes.”  Id. at 1036. 
 236. Id. at 1036.  The court stated, “Colorado courts, however, have refused to 
rewrite policies to create a distinction between natural and artificial causes where 
no language in the policy supports such a distinction.”  Id. 
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movement caused by natural phenomena.  In Travelers Personal 
Security Insurance Co. v. McClelland, an examination of the 
concurrent causation doctrine was undertaken in the context of 
damages to a home from movement of the foundation.237  Under 
Texas law, if the insurer pleads an exclusion, the insureds are 
obligated to introduce evidence sufficient to prove that the damage 
was caused solely by a covered risk or sufficient to allow a jury to 
segregate the damage caused by the insured peril from that caused 
by the excluded peril.238  The McClelland court upheld a jury verdict 
in favor of the insureds, finding that expert testimony to the effect 
that eighty percent of the foundation damage was caused by 
plumbing leaks was sufficient for a jury to render a verdict in favor 
of the homeowners.239
8. Vacancy Exclusion 
Many property policies contain a vacancy exclusion.  In 
general terms, this exclusion eliminates coverage if a building is 
vacant for a certain number of consecutive days prior to the 
occurrence resulting in the loss or damage.  A common exception 
to the vacancy exclusion pertains to buildings under construction. 
The California Court of Appeal, in TRB Investments, Inc. v. Firemen’s 
Fund Insurance Co., ruled that the “under construction” exception 
applies to a building that is being built and is not yet ready for 
occupancy.240  The exception, however, did not apply to completed 
commercial buildings that are ready for occupancy, but being 
renovated to meet the needs of a particular tenant.241  It is unclear 
why the court found “renovation” to be sufficiently different from 
“construction” so as to evade the exception’s grasp.  The court 
relied on dictionary definitions and, not surprisingly, found that 
the term “construction” is not equivalent to “renovation.”242  Yet, 
from a functional viewpoint, little significant difference exists 
between constructing a building and undertaking a major 
 237. 189 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 238. Id. at 849 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 
(Tex. 1971)). 
 239. 189 S.W.3d at 851–52.  See also Hudson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 809 N.Y.S.2d 
124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that subsidence damage to plaintiff’s home 
from a plumbing pipe leak was not excluded by insurance policy’s earth 
movement or collapse exclusion). 
 240. 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384 (Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 145 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2006). 
 241. TRB Investments, Inc., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392. 
 242. Id. at 391. 
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renovation.  In either case, it is not possible to occupy the structure 
while the activities are taking place.243
The case was appealed and the “under construction” 
exception was the focus of the California Supreme Court’s 2006 
decision in TRB Investments, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.244 In 
a matter of first impression, the highest court of California 
examined whether the “under construction” exception to the 
vacancy exclusion was limited to the erection of a new structure or 
whether it extended to all building endeavors, no matter if they 
were classified as new construction, renovations, or additions, all of 
which required the substantial and continuing presence of workers 
at the premises.245  In reversing the Court of Appeal, the California 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the insured: 
 The Court of Appeal’s focus upon whether the term 
“under construction” encompasses only the erection of 
new structures or also includes renovations thus fails to 
take into account the rationales underlying the vacancy 
exclusion and the construction exception.  We believe the 
proper inquiry for determining whether a building is 
“under construction” for purposes of defining an 
exception to the vacancy exclusion is whether the 
building project, however characterized, results in 
“substantial continuing activities” by persons associated 
with the project at the premises during the relevant time 
period.  Under that test, “sporadic entry” would be 
insufficient to find a substantial continuing presence of 
workers required for a finding of “construction.”  We 
believe this test better serves the purposes underlying the 
vacancy exclusion and more accurately reflects the 
reasonable expectations of an insured than any test 
turning upon technical distinctions between 
“construction” on the one hand and “renovation” or 
“remodeling” on the other. 
Defendant contends the building here was not “under 
construction” because, at the time of the loss, contractors 
were engaged in only “preparatory” activities in 
 243. See Warren Davis Properties V, L.L.C. v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 111 
S.W.3d 515, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that construction includes 
renovation). 
 244. 145 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2006). 
 245. Id. at 473–74. 
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contemplation of future construction.  The 
characterization of the activities here as “preparatory” is 
no more helpful than characterizing the building 
endeavor as a “renovation” or remodeling.”  Whether the 
construction activity at issue is performed in 
contemplation of, or in preparation for, a building 
endeavor of even greater scope involving more workers is 
beside the point.  The question remains the same no 
matter what stage of a construction project is at issue, i.e., 
are there “substantial continuing activities” on the 
premises by those involved in the construction 
endeavor?246
9. Non-Permanent Property Exclusion 
In Ajax Building Corp. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., damage to a 
crane was not covered as the policy contained an exclusion for 
“equipment or other property which will not become a permanent 
part of the structure(s) . . . .” 247
10. Vandalism Exclusion 
In American States Insurance Co. v. Rancho San Marcos Properties, 
LLC, a “vandalism” exclusion did not operate to exclude arson 
damages.248
11. Law and Ordinance Exclusion 
Many property policies contain an exclusion or restrictive 
endorsement that eliminates coverage for certain losses sustained 
by an insured to comply with building codes and other regulatory 
requirements.  The exclusion has been held not to restrict recovery 
for increased costs of replacing a damaged structure due to new or 
more stringent code requirements where the cause of loss is 
otherwise covered.249  More agreement seems to exist that the 
exclusion bars recovery where the insured seeks recovery for the 
costs of having to upgrade undamaged portions of a structure due 
 246. Id. at 478–79 (citations omitted). 
 247. 358 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 248. 97 P.3d 775 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 249. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 636 (Ct. App. 
2004) (stating that the exclusion operates to defeat coverage only if the cause of 
loss is an ordinance or law). 
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to regulatory requirements triggered because of the need to repair 
the damaged portions.250  The Third Circuit’s decision in Regents of 
the Mercersburg College v. Republic Franklin Insurance Co. is a twist on 
the more common coverage question presented by this exclusion.251  
In Mercersburg, the property policy contained an ordinance and law 
endorsement that actually expanded coverage.252  The endorsement 
read: 
 1. Coverage A—Coverage For Loss to the Undamaged 
Portion of the Building.  If a Covered Cause of Loss 
occurs to covered Building property[,] . . . we will pay for 
loss to the undamaged portion of the building caused by 
enforcement of any ordinance or law that: (a) requires 
demolition of parts of the same property not damaged by 
a Covered Cause of Loss; (b) regulates the construction or 
repair of buildings, or establishes zoning or land use 
requirements at the described premises; and (c) is in 
force at the time of the loss. 
 . . . . 
 3. Coverage C—Increased Cost of Construction 
Coverage.  If a Covered Cause of Loss occurs to covered 
Building property[,] . . . we will pay for the increased cost 
to repair, rebuild or construct the property caused by 
enforcement of building, zoning or land use ordinance or 
law.  If the property is repaired or rebuilt, it must be 
intended for similar occupancy as the current property, 
unless otherwise required by zoning or land use 
ordinance or law.253
The college claimed that the insurer was responsible for 
upgrades to the undamaged portions of the building to bring them 
into compliance with the International Mechanical Code, the 
National Electrical Code, and the International Plumbing Code.254  
The Borough of Mercersburg, however, did not adopt any of those 
building codes.255  Therefore, the question became whether the law 
and ordinance endorsement was triggered under these 
 250. See Chattanooga Bank Assocs. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 301 F. 
Supp. 2d 774, 779–80 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 251. 458 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 252. Id. at 162. 
 253. Id. (alterations in original). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 163. 
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circumstances.256  The Third Circuit ruled against the college, 
finding that the “loss of undamaged portions” was not “caused by 
enforcement of any” of the codes: 
Unlike the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] and 
[Pennsylvania Handicapped Act (PHA)], Mercersburg 
fails to point out any provisions of the building codes that 
mandated or required it to do any upgrades, renovations, 
etc., to the undamaged portions of Keil Hall.  Certainly, 
Mercersburg’s discretionary decision to renovate 
undamaged portions of Keil Hall triggered the 
application of the building codes as to that renovation, 
but critically important is that the building codes 
themselves did not trigger those renovations.  This 
distinguishes Mercersburg’s building codes claims from its 
ADA and PHA claims.  As a result, we affirm the District 
Court’s determination (albeit on different grounds than 
the District Court) that the Ordinance and Law 
Endorsement does not provide coverage for renovations it 
made to undamaged portions of Keil Hall in hypothetical 
compliance with codes not mandating those 
renovations.257
A common rendition of this exclusion eliminates coverage for 
loss caused by the “enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating 
construction, repair or demolition of a building or other structure, 
unless endorsed to this policy.”258  The California Court of Appeal, 
in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court, ruled that this exclusion 
does not restrict recovery for the increased costs of replacing a 
damaged structure due to new or more stringent building code 
requirements where the cause of loss is otherwise covered.259  
Instead, the exclusion operates to defeat coverage if the cause of 
the loss is an ordinance or law.260
 256. Id. at 172. 
 257. Id. (first alteration in original). 
 258. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 627 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
 259. 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 629 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 260. Id. at 632.  Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, the California court 
noted: 
As we read this provision, it does not limit [the insurance company’s] 
obligation for the cost of repair or replacement of the building when a 
loss has occurred that is covered by the policy, but merely states that if 
the loss itself is caused by an ordinance or law, there is no coverage.  For 
instance, if some safety improvement of a building to which no other loss 
had occurred were required by an ordinance or law, [the insurance 
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12. Water Without Roof Damage Exclusion 
Some property policies contain a limitation that excludes 
damage to the building’s contents due to rain, snow, or sleet unless 
the building structure first sustains damage by a covered cause of 
loss to its roof or walls through which the rain, snow, or sleet 
entered.  The meaning of this exclusion was examined in a 
situation where renovations to an apartment were stalled due to 
regulatory problems.261  At the time renovation ceased, the roof was 
completely removed and a series of tarps covered the structure.262  
Due to high winds, rainwater penetrated the tarps causing 
damage.263  The court determined that the temporary tarp structure 
was not a “roof” within the meaning of the policy provision 
permitting coverage for rain damage to interior contents where the 
roof sustained damage.264
13. Rotting Exclusion 
Common exclusionary language bars coverage for damage due 
to “rotting.”  In Topor v. Erie Insurance Co., an insured’s building 
parapet collapsed because of rotting mortar joints in the brick 
company] would not be liable.  However, when the cost of repairing or 
replacing a building that had been damaged by fire is increased by the 
requirements of an ordinance or a law, [the insurance company] is not 
relieved of that cost. 
Id. at 632–33 (quoting Bering Strait Sch. Dist. v. RLI Ins., 873 P.2d 1292, 1296 
(Alaska 1994) and Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 666 (Idaho 
1990)) (alterations in original).  See also Dupre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 1024, 
1029–30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Farmer’s Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oakland, 825 P.2d 
554, 555 (Mont. 1992); Commonwealth Ins. Co. of Am. v. Grays Harbor County, 
84 P.3d 304, 308 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding where Commonwealth drafted 
the policy “in broad terms, covering reconstruction of undamaged parts of the facility if 
required by enforcement of a law or ordinance,” and where other limitations were 
not included, any ambiguity in Commonwealth’s language is construed in favor of 
coverage because Commonwealth could have limited the coverage or written 
other restrictions).  But see Chattanooga Bank Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Md., 301 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (agreeing with Fidelity that “it is 
not liable for the cost of upgrading code violations which were discovered in areas 
not affected by the fires” under the “Demolition and increased cost of 
construction” clause, and that “discovery of code violations in non fire affected 
areas, even when the inspection would not have taken place in the absence of 
fires, fails to create liability under the terms of the insurance contract”). 
 261. Aginsky v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1231 (D. Or. 2005). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1234–36. 
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wall.265  The court determined that the rotting exclusion did not 
apply because it was limited to the rotting of organic materials such 
as wood.266
O. Mixed Causation: The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine 
While courts take the same basic interpretive approach to 
exclusions, regardless of whether they are contained in first-party 
(property insurance) or third-party (liability insurance) policies, 
differences exist.  Many of the exclusions contained in property 
policies are tailored around specific “causes of loss” or “named 
perils.”  Flood, surface water, landslide, weather conditions, and 
earth movement are common “causes of loss” exclusions.  Where a 
loss is the result of a confluence of events, i.e., the interaction of 
more than one “cause of loss,” some of which fall within coverage 
and others not, a coverage dilemma can arise.  Some jurisdictions 
deal with this situation by applying what has come to be known as 
the “efficient proximate cause” doctrine: 
The efficient proximate cause doctrine is the universal 
method for resolving coverage issues involving the 
occurrence of covered and excluded perils.  The efficient 
proximate cause is not necessarily the last act in the chain 
of events, nor necessarily is it the triggering cause, and the 
efficient proximate cause looks to the quality of the links 
and the chain of causation and is considered the 
predominating cause of the loss.267
Nevertheless, an insured cannot bring an otherwise uncovered 
event into coverage merely by recharacterizing the cause of loss by 
breaking it down into its various constituents.268  The Washington 
Supreme Court explained this principle:  
The efficient proximate cause rule applies only where two 
or more independent forces operate to cause the loss.  
When, however, the evidence shows the loss was in fact 
occasioned by only a single cause, albeit one susceptible to 
various characterizations, the efficient proximate cause 
analysis has no application.  An insured may not avoid a 
contractual exclusion merely by affixing an additional 
 265. 816 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 2006).
 266. Id. at 633. 
 267. State ex rel. State Fire & Tornado Fund of North Dakota Ins. Dept. v. 
North Dakota State Univ., 694 N.W.2d 225, 234 (N.D. 2005) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 268. Kish v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 883 P.2d 308, 311 (Wash. 1994). 
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label or separate characterization to the act or event 
causing the loss.269
Insurers have attempted to avoid the “efficient proximate 
cause” doctrine by adopting policy language designed to 
circumvent the doctrine.  A common approach, implicated in 
Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., was to draft an introductory 
clause to the exclusion section of the policy stating that the policy 
does not provide coverage if the loss would not have occurred in 
the absence of the excluded loss, regardless of whether “other 
causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded 
event to produce the loss . . . .”270  In jurisdictions where the 
doctrine is grounded in public policy concerns, this introductory 
language proved ineffective.271  To avoid this result, some insurers 
began drafting multiple cause exclusions designed to avoid 
disputes over whether the efficient proximate cause or 
predominant cause was a covered or an excluded peril.  Instead, 
these exclusions preclude coverage resulting from a combination 
of specified causes regardless of whether one of the specified 
causes is a remote cause of loss.  The California Supreme Court 
enforced such a multiple-cause exclusion in Julian v. Hartford 
Underwriters Insurance Co.272  The exclusion in question precluded 
coverage for losses caused by weather conditions that “contribute in 
any way with” an excluded cause or event such as earth movement, 
including a landslide.273  Because the policy was an “all-risk” form, 
most weather conditions were covered causes of loss and damages 
 269. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Pieper 
v. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 558 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(finding arson and brush fire were not separate and distinct perils that caused 
loss); See also Pieper v. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 558 
(Ct. App. 1997) (determining arson and brush fire were not separate and distinct 
perils that caused loss); Chadwick v. Fire Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 874 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (stating builder’s negligence and defective framing were not separate 
perils, because “[t]o say builder negligence ‘caused’ the defective framing is, in 
this context, to indulge in misleading wordplay”). 
 270. See Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
 271. Id. at 715 n.6 (“If we were to give full effect to the State Farm policy 
language excluding coverage whenever an excluded peril is a contributing or 
aggravating factor in the loss, we would be giving insurance companies carte 
blanche to deny coverage in nearly all cases. . . .  Since, in most instances, an 
insurer can point to some arguably excluded contributing factor, this rule would 
effectively transform an ‘all-risk’ policy into a ‘no-risk’ policy.”) 
 272. 110 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2005). 
 273. Id. at 904. 
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proximately caused by them fell within coverage.274  Yet, the 
weather conditions exclusion operated in such a way that, if any 
specific excluded cause of loss “contributes in any way” along with 
weather conditions, even if the weather conditions were the 
efficient proximate cause of loss, no coverage exists.275  In Julian, 
heavy rains caused a slope to fall above the insured’s home, 
triggering a landslide that caused a tree to crash into the insured’s 
home.276
California has statutorily adopted the efficient proximate cause 
doctrine.277  The weather conditions clause in Julian was not in 
conflict with the statute.278  The statute did not preclude an insurer 
from excluding some manifestations of weather conditions, but not 
others.279  Nevertheless, where the excluded peril makes only a 
minor, remote contribution to the loss, a coverage denial “would 
raise troubling questions regarding the clause’s consistency with 
the efficient proximate cause doctrine.  Denial of coverage for such 
a loss would suggest the provision of illusory insurance against 
weather conditions, raising concerns similar to those implicated in 
Howell.”280
IV. SUBROGATION REMEDIES 
After an insurance company has paid out monies under its 
policy, it may attempt to recover some or all of its payments from a 
third party on the grounds that it is subrogated to the rights of its 
insured. Subrogation is the equitable right of an insurer to be put 
in the position of its insured so that it may pursue recovery from 
any third party legally responsible to the insured for the loss paid 
by the insurer.281  Property carriers bring many subrogation actions 
because payment is triggered not on the fault of the insured, but 
on the existence of a covered cause of loss.  As a consequence, 
property insurers often have cleaner subrogation rights than 
liability insurers.  Nevertheless, no automatic prohibition against 
liability carriers seeking subrogation from third parties exists.  An 
 274. Id. at 905. 
 275. Id. at 909–10. 
 276. Id. at 905. 
 277. CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (2006). 
 278. See Julian, 110 P.3d at 912. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 911. 
 281. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467–68 (8th ed. 2004). 
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insurer, however, may not seek subrogation from one of its 
policyholders.  In addition, if the insured has not been completely 
compensated for its loss, its claim to be “made whole” may interfere 
with the insurer’s subrogation claims.  Moreover, an insurer’s rights 
to subrogation may be compromised or eliminated through a 
provision in a construction contract whereby the insured waives its 
subrogation rights. 
It is not uncommon for one insurance company to seek 
reimbursement from another insurer for losses paid out due to a 
construction-related injury.  Under Illinois law, the grounds upon 
which one insurer can seek equitable subrogation from the other 
are: 
(1) the defendant carrier must be primarily liable to the 
insured for a loss under a policy of insurance; (2) the 
plaintiff must be secondarily liable to the insured for the 
same loss under its policy; and (3) the plaintiff carrier 
must have discharged its liability to the insured and at the 
same time extinguish the liability of the defendant 
carrier.282
In one case, the plaintiff insurer was denied equitable 
subrogation because it provided additional insured coverage to the 
general contractor for liability arising out of the work of one 
subcontractor; whereas, it sought subrogation from an insurer that 
provided additional insured coverage to the general contractor for 
liability arising out of a different subcontractor’s liability.283  
Therefore, the two insurers did not insure the same risk.284
In Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Co.,285 
the differences between equitable subrogation and equitable 
contribution were discussed: 
 The right of subrogation is purely derivative.  An insurer 
entitled to subrogation is in the same position as an 
assignee of the insured’s claim, and succeeds only to the 
rights of the insured. The subrogated insurer is said to 
“stand in the shoes” of its insured, because it has no 
greater rights than the insured and is subject to the same 
defenses assertable against the insured . . . . Equitable 
contribution is entirely different.  It is the right to recover, 
 282. Home Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004). 
 283. Id. at 999. 
 284. See id. 
 285. 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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not from the party primarily liable for the loss, but from a 
co-obligor who shares such liability with the party seeking 
contribution.  In the insurance context, the right to 
contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to 
indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one 
insurer has paid more than its fair share of the loss or 
defended the action without any participation by the 
others.286
These legal principles formed the context within which a 
subcontractor’s insurer was denied equitable contribution from the 
general contractor’s insurer due to the indemnity agreement 
contained in the insureds’ contract.287  The indemnity provision 
required the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for 
loss except that occasioned by the general contractor’s sole 
negligence.288  Under the circumstances, the court concluded that 
to require the general contractor’s insurer to contribute to the loss 
paid by the subcontractor’s insurer when the general contractor 
was not liable to the subcontractor for the loss would be 
inconsistent with “equitable principles designed to accomplish 
ultimate justice.”289
An insurer’s subrogation interest can complicate an insured’s 
ability to settle with a tortfeasor.  Unless the insured can give the 
 286. Id. at 135 (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
 287. Id. at 140. 
 288. Id. at 136. 
 289. Id. at 139.  Courts have held that where two or more insurers cover loss, 
no right of contribution exists for the insurer that paid the loss on behalf of an 
insured that owed broad indemnity to the insured of the non-contributing insurer.  
See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.  v. Am. Intern. Spec. Lines, 365 F.3d 263 
(4th Cir. 2004); Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d 429 
(5th Cir. 2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2002); 
Continental Cas. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 238 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2000).  See 
also Home Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d at 1003 (“In Illinois, an excess insurer cannot seek 
equitable contribution from a primary insurer because excess and primary carriers 
insure different risks.  The rationale for such a holding is that the protections 
under an excess policy do not begin until those under a primary policy have been 
exhausted.  Therefore, even if both Home and Cincinnati could be said to insure 
Allied for the same loss, Home’s status as an excess insurer precludes it from 
seeking equitable contribution from Cincinnati, a primary insurer.”) (citations 
omitted); Land v. Tall House Bldg. Co., 602 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that construction contractor’s insurer could not bring contribution claim 
against stucco manufacturer, where contractor could be liable to home purchasers 
for construction defects based only on breach of contract and not tort and, thus, 
contractor was precluded from being a joint tortfeasor who could recover from 
another joint tortfeasor under contribution statute). 
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tortfeasor assurance that its insurer will not pursue any subrogation 
interest, a tortfeasor may be reluctant to participate in a partial 
settlement.  Jurisdictions have developed different ways to deal with 
this situation. Minnesota, for example, distinguishes between first-
party automobile insurance disputes and those involving first-party 
property insurance disputes.290  The automobile losses, governed by 
the state’s No-Fault Insurance Act, require the insured to give 
notice to the automobile insurer before reaching a settlement with 
the tortfeasor so as to permit the insurer the right to preserve its 
subrogation rights by matching the tortfeasor’s offer.291  This same 
mechanism, however, does not apply in the property insurance 
context.  The property insurance context is governed solely by 
contract terms agreed to by the parties.292  Under these 
circumstances, the insurer’s denial of coverage benefits permits the 
insured to freely settle with a tortfeasor and compromise the 
insurer’s subrogation rights: 
Thus, if the [Insurer’s] denial of coverage was erroneous, 
such denial will have relieved Owner of the obligation to 
protect [Insurer’s] subrogation rights and will have 
authorized Owner to accept the Rule 68 offer of judgment 
without the consent of [Insurer].  In so concluding, we 
are mindful that an insurer such as [Insurer] must be 
allowed a reasonable time to investigate the claims of its 
insured before it can be found to have materially 
breached the contract by the denial of coverage.  But the 
present facts show that [Insurer] had ample time to 
investigate Owner’s claim and even to have its coverage 
defenses determined by a declaratory judgment action if it 
did not want to be confronted with the prospect of a 
settlement between the Owner and the tortfeasors.293
 290. See Schwickert, Inc. v. Winnebago Seniors, Ltd., 680 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 
2004). 
 291. MINN. STAT. § 65B.53 (2005). 
 292. See Schwickert, 680 N.W.2d at 83. 
 293. Id. at 86; see also Youell v. Grimes, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175 (D. Kan. 
2002) (holding that erroneous denial of coverage in third-party liability insurance 
relieves the insured of the obligation to protect the insurer’s subrogation rights); 
Great Divide Ins. Co. v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 609–10 (Alaska 2003) 
(holding that a settlement agreement by the insured with the tortfeasor without 
the consent of the insurer did not relieve the insurer of its obligations under a 
commercial general liability policy even where the insurer had provided a defense 
but materially breached the policy by unreasonably refusing to consent to the 
settlement); Home Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, 658 N.W.2d 522, 
534 (Minn. 2003) (holding that third-party liability insurer’s erroneous denial of 
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Disputes can sometimes arise between insureds and insurers 
over the sharing of recoveries from third-party tortfeasors.  Where 
an insured has not been fully reimbursed for its loss by the insurer, 
potential exists for disagreement over just when the insurer’s 
subrogation interest gets paid.  Many jurisdictions adopt the “make 
whole” principle, which holds that the insurer does not begin to 
recover on its subrogation interest until the insured’s loss is paid in 
full.294  Sometimes insurance policies will contain provisions that 
essentially give the insurer a contract right to subrogation, in 
addition to whatever equitable rights of subrogation might arise by 
virtue of its paying a loss under the policy.  These “subrogation 
provisions” should be distinguished from “reimbursement 
provisions,” which require the insured to pay over to the insurer 
any settlements received from third parties.295 As a general rule, 
subrogation provisions are subject to the “make whole” principle, 
and, therefore, the insurer’s contract subrogation rights will not 
permit recovery until the insured is paid in full.296  Reimbursement 
provisions, on the other hand, are not subject to the “make whole” 
limitation and, therefore, may require an insured to pay all 
settlement proceeds over to an insurer even though the insured has 
not fully been reimbursed for its loss.297  Not surprisingly, courts 
tend to interpret policy provisions entitling the insurer to third-
party recoveries as “subrogation” provisions, where possible.298
One of the greatest impediments to an insurer’s subrogation 
rights is a contract provision whereby the insured waives its right of 
subrogation.  These provisions are common in construction 
contracts.  Moreover, they are generally enforced.  This may be the 
case even where the tortfeasor against whom subrogation is sought 
was grossly negligent.299  As a general rule, most construction 
coverage and failure to defend insured was a breach of contract that suspended 
the obligation of the insured to provide notice that was otherwise required by the 
policy). 
 294. See New Orleans Assets, L.L.C v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 295. Id. at 375–76. 
 296. Id. at 375. 
 297. But see id. at 376 n.7. 
 298. See id.  at 372. 
 299. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 317 F. 
Supp. 2d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Court concludes that New York courts 
would likely permit waiver of subrogation clauses to bar claims of gross negligence 
. . . .”).  However, earlier cases concluded that waiver of subrogation could not bar 
subrogated claims for gross negligence.  See Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Morris 
Goldman Real Estate Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Travelers Ind. 
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contract waivers of subrogation are triggered upon the existence of 
property coverage.  In essence, they leave the loss with the property 
insurer.  For example, in Gray Insurance Co. v. Old Tyme Builders, 
Inc., a property insurer claimed that a subcontractor waived the 
subcontract’s waiver of subrogation by voluntarily undertaking to 
repair its defective work.300  The insurer sought to recover for the 
consequential losses incurred by its insured.301  The court rejected 
this argument, finding that repairing one’s defective work does not 
constitute a waiver of a contract right to be free from subrogation 
claims.302  Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in 
Nodaway Valley Bank v. E.L. Crawford Construction, Inc. discussed 
whether the presence of an indemnity clause lessened or 
eliminated the scope of coverage under a waiver of subrogation 
clause.303  The property carrier seeking subrogation from a general 
contractor and subcontractor argued that the broad indemnity 
clauses contained in their contracts, running in favor of the 
insured, did not limit the protection afforded by the contract’s 
waiver of subrogation provision.304  The court disagreed: 
 Under the plain language of the clauses, the waiver of 
subrogation clause prevents Bank [insurer was suing in 
the insured’s name] from pursuing a claim against 
Crawford & Crane for the fire damage to the extent that 
such damage is covered by property insurance that 
contract required Bank to obtain.  Under the plain 
language of the indemnification clause, Crawford agreed 
to indemnify Bank for all property damage caused by any 
act or omission of anyone who performs services under 
the agreement.  The indemnification clause is silent as to 
whether the agreement to indemnify applies to damage 
covered by property insurance. . . . In interpreting the 
waiver of subrogation and indemnification provisions, 
however, this court cannot merely look at the two clauses 
in a vacuum.  The clauses must be read in the context of 
the entire contract. . . . A reasonable interpretation of the 
indemnification clause that is in harmony with the 
insurance procurement requirement and the waiver of 
subrogation clause is that the indemnification clause 
Co. of Conn. v. Losco Group, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 300. 878 So. 2d 603 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 301. Id. at 605. 
 302. Id. at 608. 
 303. 126 S.W.3d 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 304. Id. at 823. 
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refers to compensation and liability for losses not covered 
by the property insurance policy, that is, compensation 
and liability to third parties.305
A. Contractual Waivers of Subrogation 
An insurer that pays out a loss on behalf of its insured is 
subrogated to the rights of its insured to pursue those responsible 
for the loss.  A number of themes recur in subrogation cases.  
Frequently, disputes arise between an insured and insurer over 
priority where the insured has not been fully reimbursed for its 
loss.306  In the construction business, parties often waive rights to 
seek recovery from one another to the extent property insurance 
covers the loss.307  The scope and enforceability of these waivers, 
however, can be the subject of dispute. 
Contractual waivers of subrogation rights are also common 
features of commercial lease agreements.  One such waiver played 
a pivotal role in determining who bore the ultimate risk of loss of 
one of the WTC buildings.308  In addition to the collapse of 
buildings One and Two of the WTC, building Seven was also lost as 
a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.309  Portions 
of the collapsing twin towers fell onto Seven WTC “causing the fires 
to spread to that building, where they created another inferno,” 
resulting in the building’s collapse.310  The building’s lessee, 
Silverstein Properties, Inc. (Silverstein), received a substantial 
payment from its property insurer, Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI).311  
 305. Id. at 826--30.  See also Chubb Ins. Co. v. DeChambre, 808 N.E.2d 37, 42 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that under terms of property policy, subcontractor 
was additional insured and, therefore, the anti-subrogation doctrine precluded 
insurer’s claim against subcontractor); Midwestern Indem. Co. v. Sys. Builders, 
Inc., 801 N.E.2d 661, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that waiver of subrogation 
provision applied to losses incurred after the building was complete); S. 
Tippecanoe Sch. Bldg. Corp. v. Shambaugh & Son, Inc., 395 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the insurance procurement clause alone established 
that the parties had contracted away the risk of first-party property loss under the 
all-risk carrier and that the contract did not require the presence of a waiver of 
subrogation clause to accomplish this risk allocation scheme). 
 306. See generally 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 27, 
§ 11:102; 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 85, § 222:14. 
 307. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 27, § 7:154. 
 308. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 387 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 309. Id. at 301. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
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In turn, “IRI sued the airlines, the airport security companies, and 
the airline manufacturer for allowing the terrorists to board and 
hijack the planes.”312  The insurer also “sued the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey . . . , the owner of 7 WTC, and Citigroup, 
Inc.,” a sublessee of a substantial portion of the building.313  IRI 
alleged that Citigroup was grossly negligent in designing and 
installing an “emergency generator system that utilized an 
unreasonable amount of diesel fuel and that continuously pumped 
that fuel unreasonably close to critical structural supports in the 
building without proper safeguards.”314  IRI alleged that the 
building’s collapse was due, in part, to this system catching fire and 
weakening critical structural supports.315
Citigroup defended on the grounds that its lease with 
Silverstein contained a waiver of subrogation provision.316  IRI 
countered by claiming that it would be against public policy to 
shield Citigroup from liability for its gross negligence.317  While 
New York law does invalidate waivers purporting to exonerate a 
party for willful or grossly negligent acts, one needs to do more 
than simply make the allegation: 
The purpose, then, of excepting claims of gross 
negligence from the rule permitting the release of claims 
for negligence, is to ensure that parties will have legal 
recourse for injuries from particularly malicious behavior.  
The rule exists to protect parties in positions of weaker 
bargaining power from unknowingly agreeing in advance 
to allow the other party to recklessly disregard its rights in 
broad and unforeseeable ways.  However, parties, 
especially those of equal bargaining power, should be able 
to rely upon the general New York rule that enforces 
contracts for the release of claims of liability.  If a party 
needs only to add gross negligence as a theory of liability 
to force litigation to proceed through discovery and a 
trial, contracting parties would be stripped of the 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 302. 
 314. Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 387 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (quoting Pl.’s 
Am. Compl. ¶ 55, Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 387 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (No. 02 Civ. 7170)). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 304. 
 317. Id. at 306. 
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substantial benefit of their bargain, that is, avoiding the 
expense of lengthy litigation.318
Simply misdesigning a generator system without more did not 
rise to the level of “reckless disregard.”319
The Second Circuit, applying New York law, came to a similar 
conclusion in a case involving a waiver of subrogation clause 
contained in a construction contract.  In St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, the owner sought to erect a 
building in Times Square, New York City.320  The construction 
contract required the owner to secure Builder’s Risk insurance 
policy, which contained a broad waiver of subrogation clause.321  
On a more unusual note, the contract also required the contractor 
to obtain “similar waivers, each in favor of all parties enumerated 
above.”322  Notwithstanding this obligation, the contractor’s liability 
insurers reserved their right to seek subrogation for any covered 
loss.323  A forty-nine story scaffolding, designed and built by the 
contractor, collapsed, causing extensive damage to the site and 
surrounding area, and resulting in the death of one person.324  The 
owner’s builder’s risk carrier paid $19 million to satisfy the 
property claims arising out of the collapse.325  The insurer then 
brought a subrogation claim against the contractor, alleging, 
 318. Id. at  307. 
 319. Id. at 309–10. See also Great N. Ins. Co. v. Paino Assocs., 364 F. Supp. 2d 7 
(D. Mass. 2005) (raising questions of joint liability where tenant’s property insurer 
brings subrogation action against landlord for negligent supervision of employee 
that started fire in restroom); Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. v. Vaszil, 873 A.2d 
1030 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (“insurer had right of subrogation, in light of lease 
language making the tenant liable for damage caused to premises”); Burns Int’l 
Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that where tenant’s property insurer brought subrogation action against 
landlord’s security contractor to recover for theft loss, comparative fault statute 
applied and permitted apportionment among security contractor, tenant, and 
non-party landlord); Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801 (Md. 2005) 
(discussing at length the “no subrogation per se” rule between landlord and 
tenants, explaining that even in the absence of a contractual waiver in the lease, 
the landlord’s insurer has no subrogation right against tenant as both are 
considered co-insureds under the policy); McEwan v. Mountain Land Support 
Corp., 116 P.3d 955 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (holding that where lease did not 
require tenant to obtain separate property insurance, landlord’s insurer could not 
seek subrogation as tenant was a co-insured under the policy). 
 320. 409 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 83. 
 323. Id. at 78. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 78. 
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among other things, a claim of gross negligence.326  The insurer 
argued that well-established New York law did not permit 
exculpatory provisions to be enforced where the loss was the result 
of gross negligence.327  The Second Circuit, however, rejected this 
argument, finding that a “waiver of subrogation” provision is 
different than an exculpatory clause.328  Waivers of subrogation 
agreements, like indemnity provisions, “shift the source of 
compensation without restricting the injured party’s ability to 
recover.”329  By contrast, exculpatory clauses deprive the victim of 
compensation.330  With respect to the contractor’s obligation to 
obtain similar waivers, the court found that this promise extended 
only to property coverage—which the contractor did not secure—
and did not require waivers from the contractor’s liability 
carriers.331
B. Equitable Subrogation vs. Equitable Contribution 
The Supreme Court of Illinois issued an interesting decision in 
Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., where it denied an 
insurer the right to seek equitable contribution from another 
insurer because the carriers did not insure the same risk.332  While 
both carriers provided additional insured coverage to a general 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 86. 
 329. Id. (quoting Austro v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 487 N.E.2d 267 (N.Y. 
1985)). 
 330. Id. at 85. 
 331. Id.  See also S.C. Nestel, Inc. v. Future Constr., Inc., 836 N.E.2d 445 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that subcontractor’s failure to give notice to general 
contractor before hiring a sub-subcontractor did not amount to gross negligence 
or willful misconduct and hence enforced waiver of subrogation provision); 
Reliance Nat’l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Servs., Corp., 868 A.2d 220 (Me. 2005) 
(holding waiver of subrogation rights enforceable even in the face of claims of 
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct and regardless of alleged 
violation of positive statutory duty concerning historic properties); Behr v. Hook, 
787 A.2d 499 (Vt. 2001) (holding that the AIA waiver clause protects 
subcontractor for gross negligence).  But see Colonial Props. Realty, Ltd. v. Lowder 
Const. Co., 567 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding waiver-of-subrogation 
clauses ineffective against gross negligence claim); Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. 
Graves Sheet Metal, 827 N.E.2d 607, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that waiver 
of subrogation clause in prime contract does not bar owner’s gross negligence 
claim against contractor: “[u]nder Michigan law, a party may not contract against 
liability for its own gross negligence.”). 
 332. 821 N.E.2d 269, 316 (Ill. 2004). 
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contractor, they did so for different named insureds.333  Under the 
facts of this case, the plaintiff insurer was deemed to be excess and 
the defendant insurer primary.334  Under well-settled Illinois law, an 
excess carrier does not insure the same risk as a primary carrier 
and, therefore, no right of equitable contribution existed.335  The 
plaintiff insurer, however, was entitled to seek equitable 
subrogation, except for the fact that it waived its right by failing to 
seek full reimbursement from defendant insurer during the 
underlying litigation.336
C. Anti-subrogation Rule 
Contractors and subcontractors may have an additional avenue 
of protection against the subrogation claims of property insurers 
beyond an express contractual waiver of subrogation contained in 
many standard form construction contracts.  A well-established rule 
of insurance law exists that an insurer may not subrogate against its 
own insured.337 Therefore, if the contractor is deemed an insured 
under the builder’s risk policy, the carrier may not be entitled to 
subrogate against it.  This is sometimes referred to as the “anti-
subrogation rule.”  The trick, of course, is to be deemed an insured 
under the policy.  In Tri-State Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. 
Commercial Group West, LLC, a subcontractor was unsuccessful in 
obtaining insured status under a builder’s risk policy sufficient to 
invoke the anti-subrogation rule.338  The court rejected the 
subcontractor’s analogy to the landlord/tenant case law, holding 
that a tenant is a co-insured under the landlord’s property policy 
unless the lease expressly states otherwise.339  The privity of a 
landlord/tenant relationship is closer than the privity that exists 
between an owner and a subcontractor.340  Thus, where the policy 
does not name the subcontractor as a co-insured under the policy, 
the status of its relationship as a subcontractor does not give it 
blanket immunity from the property carrier’s claims, merely 
 333. Id. at 310. 
 334. Id. at 317. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 326–27. 
 337. Andrew B. Downs et al., Recent Developments in Property Insurance Law, 34 
TORT & INS. L.J. 619,  636 (1999). 
 338. 698 N.W.2d 483, 492 (N.D. 2005). 
 339. Id. at 488. 
 340. Id. 
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because the property insurance covered some of the 
subcontractor’s property.341
An insurer that pays a loss under its policy is usually 
subrogated to the rights of its insured to recover some or all of its 
payment from third parties who are responsible for the loss in the 
first instance.  Property insurers are fairly diligent at pursuing their 
subrogation rights against contractors and design professionals 
responsible for property losses.  Perhaps the greatest impediment 
to the exercise of this remedy in the construction industry is the 
common practice of insureds waiving their subrogation rights.  
Most standard form contracts contain a “waiver of subrogation” 
provision by which the owner waives its subrogation rights against 
contractors, subcontractors, and design professionals to the extent 
its losses are covered by property insurance.342  These waivers are 
routinely upheld.343
Other impediments can exist to pursuing subrogation 
 341. Id. at 492.  See also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Gage Plumbing & Heating 
Co., Inc., 433 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1970) (finding that where property policy 
covered unnamed subcontractor’s property, it was a co-insured); Travelers Indem. 
Co. v. Losco Group, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that 
an unnamed contractor is not co-insured because there was nothing in the 
language of the policy to show an intention to benefit the contractor); Richmond 
Steel, Inc. v. Legal & Gen. Assurance Soc’y, Ltd., 821 F. Supp. 793, 799 (D.P.R. 
1993) (noting that an unnamed subcontractor is not co-insured, because policy 
language is not sufficiently expansive to cover subcontractor absent a “property of 
others” clause); Baugh-Belarde Const. Co. v. Coll. Utils. Corp., 561 P.2d 1211, 
1216 (Alaska 1977) (applying the anti-subrogation rule in the context of a 
builder’s risk policy for an unnamed party); La. Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 
38 So. 2d 807, 808 (La. Ct. App. 1949) (re-inforcing the same principle expressed 
in Transamerica); Willis Realty Assocs. v. Cimino Const. Co., 623 A.2d 1287, 1289 
(Me. 1993) (reasoning that a contractor is not impliedly co-insured under policy 
because coverage does not extend to personal property of others within the 
control of the named insured); Factory Ins. Ass’n v. Donco Corp., 496 S.W.2d 331, 
332–34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that an unnamed contractor was co-insured 
under policy which contained an “also covers” provision that included similar 
property of others); McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 515 
S.W.2d 32, 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (stating that an unnamed subcontractor that 
did not pay for insurance premiums and only had interest in certain tools on 
property was not co-insured under builder’s risk policy). 
 342. See BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 27, § 11:100. 
 343. See Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 709 N.W.2d 82, 84 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a subrogation waiver in contract between 
contractor and manufacturing facility was enforceable and thus waiver precluded 
insurer from pursuing contractor or its general liability insurer for subrogation).  
But see Reed & Reed, Inc. v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 431 F.3d 384, 388 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the waiver of a subrogation clause contained in “idiosyncratic” 
contract documents did not apply to post-construction activities). 
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remedies.  In some jurisdictions, an insurer’s right to subrogate 
against non-participating insurers is limited to insurers assuming 
the same risks as the carrier seeking subrogation.  The Illinois 
Supreme Court had occasion to address this issue in Home Insurance 
Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,344 where it explained in detail the 
differences between contribution, indemnification, and 
subrogation rights in the context of multiple insurers: 
The terms “contribution,” “indemnification,” and 
“subrogation” are often used interchangeably, but there 
are distinct differences between [sic] them.  The remedies 
of contribution and indemnity are mutually exclusive, and 
contribution is prohibited where a party has a right to 
indemnity.  Contribution, as it pertains to insurance law, is 
an equitable principle arising among coinsurers which 
permits one insurer who has paid the entire loss, or 
greater than its share of the loss, to be reimbursed from 
other insurers who are also liable for the same loss.  
Contribution applies to multiple, concurrent insurance 
situations and is only available where the concurrent 
policies insure the same entities, the same interests, and 
the same risks.  These elements must be met before the 
insurance can be considered concurrent or double.  
Accordingly, when two insurers cover separate and 
distinct risks, there can be no contribution among them. 
 In contrast to contribution, subrogation and 
indemnification are devices for placing the entire burden 
for a loss on the party ultimately liable or responsible for 
it and by whom it should have been discharged.  
Indemnification differs from subrogation in that the 
entity seeking indemnification does so in its own right, 
while in the latter the subrogee succeeds to another’s 
right to payment. 
 It is well settled that the doctrine of equitable 
contribution is not applicable to primary/excess insurer 
issues.  This is because by definition the policies do not 
cover the same risks—the protections under the excess 
policy do not begin until those of the primary policy 
cease.345
 344. 821 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. 2004). 
 345. Id. at 276–77 (citations omitted) (holding that plaintiff excess insurer was 
not entitled to equitable contribution from primary carriers but was entitled to 
pursue that portion of equitable subrogation it had not waived).  See also Safeco 
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 842 (Ct. App. 2006) 
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Another restriction on an insurer’s ability to secure a 
subrogation remedy is the superior equities doctrine.  This 
restrictive principle prevents an insurer from recovering against a 
party whose equities are equal or superior to those of the insurer.346  
This doctrine is usually invoked in the context where the insurer is 
seeking to subrogate against third parties who are not other 
insurers.  In some jurisdictions, the application of this doctrine 
depends on whether the source of the insurer’s right to 
subrogation arises by operation of law (legal or equitable 
subrogation) or by contract (conventional subrogation).  
Jurisdictions that make this distinction usually limit its application 
to instances where the insurer seeks to enforce the terms of a 
separate contract between its insured and a third party.347  In State 
Farm General Insurance Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., State Farm 
argued that a fire on its insureds’ property was the result of 
respondents’ negligence in failing to provide proper fire-safe 
equipment and its failure to keep combustible items away from one 
another.348  The court determined that the superior equities 
doctrine applied and remanded the matter for determination of 
whether the defendants were in a better position to avoid the loss 
than the insurer or its insured: 
 Contrary to the extreme positions advanced by the 
parties, we conclude the issue is whether respondents 
were in a better position to avoid the loss than State Farm 
or its insureds.  State Farm alleges that respondents 
negligently permitted the fire to spread to its insureds’ 
(stating that in an action for equitable contribution, the settling insurer meets its 
burden of proof when it makes a prima facie showing of coverage under the non-
participating insurer’s policy and the burden then shifts to the recalcitrant insurer 
to prove the absence of actual coverage); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Home 
Assurance Co., Inc., 858 N.E.2d 530, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (finding owner’s 
insurer not entitled to equitable subrogation from subcontractor’s insurer due to 
policy exclusion; the “mend the hold” doctrine did not apply as subcontractor’s 
insurer did not materially change its coverage position once litigation ensued). 
 346. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (8th ed. 2004). 
 347. See Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 265 F.3d 601, 626–28 
(7th Cir. 2001); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of 
Wash., D.C., 646 A.2d 966, 967 (D.C. 1994); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 552 N.E.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. 1990).  Other jurisdictions, such as California, 
place no emphasis on this distinction.  See Meyers v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. 
Ass’n, 77 P.2d 1084, 1087, 1090 (Cal. 1938) (exploring the superior equities 
doctrine in the context of a subrogation action brought against neighboring 
landowner and property manager by an insurer that paid for a fire loss to a 
condominium association and one of its unit owners). 
 348. 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 785 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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property by failing to provide non-combustible metal trash 
cans, failing to promulgate and post rules establishing a 
system for the safe disposal of fireplace ashes, and failing 
to keep combustible materials (i.e., trash cans) a safe 
distance away from other combustible materials (i.e., wood 
fencing and siding).  The failure to provide the safe 
disposal of ashes arguably could be characterized as 
promoting or encouraging the spread of fire.  Moreover, 
the implementation of a method for safe disposal of fire 
ashes, including appropriate trash cans, possibly could 
have prevented the fire from occurring. 
 . . . .   
 The gravamen of State Farm’s subrogation claim in the 
present case is that respondents negligently permitted a 
fire to occur and to spread to its insureds’ property.  It 
seems inequitable to bar State Farm from pursuing its 
claim against respondents solely because they did not 
place the ignition source in the trash can [they did not 
actually start the fire].  Subrogation advances an 
important policy rationale underlying the tort system by 
forcing a wrongdoer who helped to cause a loss to bear 
the burden of reimbursing the insurer for payments made 
to its insured as a result of the wrongdoer’s acts and 
omissions. 
 In the case at bench the contest is between an innocent 
insurance company (which admittedly received premiums 
for the very loss that occurred) and alleged tortfeasors 
(who did not physically start the fires but whose 
negligence allegedly permitted the fire to be started and 
to spread by failing to provide for the safe disposal of 
fireplace ashes).  On this record, we cannot say that 
respondents are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 
based on the doctrine of superior equities.349
D. Assignment of Remedies 
Whereas subrogation arises by operation of law, a party’s 
assignment rights arise out of contract.  Where an insurer declines 
to provide a defense or indemnification, thereby leaving its insured 
exposed to direct loss from a third-party claim, the insured may be 
inclined to settle the lawsuit by assigning its rights under the 
 349. Id. at 800–01 (citations omitted). 
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insurance policy to the claimant.  Many insurance policies contain 
an anti-assignment clause.  These clauses generally restrict the 
insured from assigning the policy without the prior written consent 
of the company.  Unless the clause is expressly drafted to apply to 
post-loss situations, the majority position is that the limitation 
applies only in a pre-loss context: 
 The Vermont Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether a post-loss assignment violates the anti-
assignment clause of an insurance policy.  When state law 
is not clear, this court must predict how the highest court 
would rule. . . . This court may consider decisions in other 
jurisdictions on the same or analogous issues. . . . [T]he 
majority rule developed in many states that an anti-
assignment clause is valid with respect to transfers that 
were made prior to, but not after, the insured-against loss 
has occurred.   
 The reasoning behind the development of this rule is 
premised on the nature of the contract.  An insurer has 
bargained to accept the risk presented by the particular 
insured with whom it has contracted.  The insurer’s 
exposure to risk is altered if the insured assigns the policy 
to another before there is a covered loss.  Hence, this rule 
protects the insurer’s interest in insulating itself from 
unforeseen risk.  However, once the loss occurs, the 
insurer is obligated to cover the loss agreed to under the 
terms of the policy.  This obligation is not altered when 
the claimant is not the party who was originally insured.  
The accrual of an insurance claim extinguishes the 
insurer’s interest in the risk profile of the insured, thereby 
converting the claim into, in effect, a chose in action.  
Hence, after the loss occurs there is no additional risk to 
the insurance company if the insured assigns its right to 
any claims or proceeds under the policy to another.  After 
the loss the anti-assignment clause serves only to limit the 
free assignability of the claims, which is not favored by 
law.350
 350. R.L. Vallee, Inc. v. Am. Intern. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 
428, 434–35 (D. Vt. 2006) (inner quotations and citations omitted).  See also 
Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(stating that anti-assignment clause applies only to pre-loss assignments); Noya v. 
A.W. Coulter Trucking Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that 
a liability insurer that refused tender of defense may not intervene once insured 
has agreed to a settlement that assigns to underlying plaintiffs any recovery in a 
future bad-faith action as intervention would cause substantial prejudice to the 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Managing risk in the construction industry is a complex web of 
contract allocation, mitigation techniques, and third-party 
products.  Property insurance forms the nucleus of all third-party 
products, which include a variety of insurance products and, on 
occasion, payment security devices such as payment bonds, letters 
of credit, and performance guarantees, like performance bonds.  
Property insurance is intended to respond to such major risks as 
fire, wind, and water, and their effects of the elements on the 
project.  Property coverage plays a central role in any risk 
management matrix.  Unlike liability coverages, which are offered 
through relatively standard policies, property coverage is more 
varied.  Many issues, however, recur.  It is critical for construction 
law practitioners to understand basic property coverages and the 
common legal issues that arise in connection with this crucial risk 
management product. 
 
insured and the plaintiffs); Antal’s Rest., Inc. v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 680 
A.2d 1386 (D.C. 1996) (citing cases from Alabama, Maine, Wisconsin, California, 
Georgia, Illinois, and New York); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 
231, 237–38 (Iowa 2001) (noting the weight of authority supporting the majority 
rule and citing to cases from Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Texas, North 
Carolina, Delaware, Missouri, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Washington, 
and West Virginia). 
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